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The State can tell you the exact square footage of a transformer pad on trust land. It cannot tell you why the lights go out.

On August 11, 2026, the California State Lands Commission delivered the records responsive to our March 27 Public Records Act request. Getting them here took 137 days and four attempts: a June 30 production date that slipped to July 17, a flash drive mailed by FedEx on July 29 and reported delivered July 30 that never arrived, two failed Google Drive transfers, and finally a Dropbox link. We want to say plainly that Commission counsel worked the delivery problem in good faith and kept us informed throughout. The problem is not the delivery. The problem is what is inside.

We have now read the entire production — all 4,258 pages across six PDFs. Every page carries a machine-readable text layer, so nothing here rests on a keyword search failing against an unreadable scan. We checked that first.

What 3,629 Pages Are Actually About

The bulk of the production is a single 3,629-page file. It is a meticulous document. It tracks sixty separate utility easements on Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island, each with its own square-footage delta — plus 1,092 square feet here, minus 330 there, plus 49 for a modification. It contains 2,880 metes-and-bounds survey bearings, 1,115 coordinates carried to two or more decimal places, 1,069 square-footage figures, and 611 acreage calculations. Six sequential memoranda, First through Sixth, memorialize where each easement sits.

Now the same file, searched for the subject of our request:

A zero is only a finding if the instrument works. On the same text, the same search returns easement 6,436 times, Treasure Island 2,174, memorandum 1,688, BKF — the surveying firm — 1,431, and Yerba Buena 1,328. The search works. The subject is simply absent.

One word deserves a caution, because it looks like a hit and is not. The file uses "grid" 73 times. Every instance refers to the CCSF-CS13 low-distortion grid projection — a surveying coordinate system. Not one refers to the electrical grid.

The Report That Twice Did Not Exist

Item 7 of our March request asked for the Standardized Reporting Forms (SLC 150) that TIDA is required to file with the Commission each year, for fiscal years 2022-23, 2023-24, and 2024-25.

On April 1, 2026, the Commission wrote: "Notably, there are no additional records in response to the seventh item in your request. We will consider this item in your request resolved."

On July 16, 2026, the Commission wrote again, on the same item: "All responsive records were provided in response to your PRA request from January 18, 2026. There are no other responsive records."

On August 11, 2026, the Commission produced the SLC 150 for Fiscal Year 2024-25.

We do not think anyone lied. We think nobody looked — because after April the item was marked resolved, and a resolved item does not get searched. But the consequence is real: the forms for FY2022-23 and FY2023-24 have still never been produced, and on the strength of two "no records" determinations, there is no sign anyone ever went looking for them.

Three Years the Law Says Should Have Been On The Website Already

Public Resources Code section 6306(e)(4) is not ambiguous:

"All forms and supporting statements submitted pursuant to this section shall be public records and be made available on the commission's Internet Web site."

We should never have needed a records request for these at all. So we checked the Commission's own website. Its Treasure Island Development Authority grantee page publishes TIDA reporting forms for fiscal years 2014-15 through 2021-22 — and then stops. There is no form posted for FY2022-23, FY2023-24, or FY2024-25. We tested the file locations directly, with known-good years as a control: the 2021 and 2022 forms load; 2023, 2024, and 2025 return "not found."

The Commission has the FY2024-25 form. It produced that form to us this month. As of today it is still not posted.

What The Two Pages Show

Read the published forms in sequence and TIDA reports the trust fund moving like this:

Two things fall out of that sequence.

The first is the gap. The FY2021-22 form closes at ($55,891,727). The FY2024-25 form opens at ($70,992,746). $15,101,019 in reported trust losses occurred between those two numbers, and it is documented in no form the Commission has published or produced. The money moved during precisely the two years the Commission twice told us contained no records.

The second is line 3(c). In every single year on record — nine of them — TIDA answered that it made no capital improvement over $250,000 on these lands. The FY2024-25 form says it in the present tense: "No improvements over $250,000 were made in the current fiscal year. A total of $1,405,000 is anticipated in FY 2025-26."

For scale: in FY2024-25 TIDA reported $10,737,373 in trust revenue against $17,351,335 in expenses charged to the trust — a $6,613,962 loss for the year. Over the same eleven years, residents documented 216 power outages, thirty of them in 2025 alone, on electrical infrastructure built in the 1940s.

The same form also reports that TIDA maintains no separate fund for trust assets and prepares no separate financial statements for the trust, folding both into the City's annual financial report. Section 6306(d) requires that trust funds "be segregated in separate accounts from nontrust received or generated funds." We raise that as a question, not a verdict.

"Not Within The Commission's Purview"

The Commission's July 16 determination letter closed with this:

"In addition, Commission staff would like to further emphasize that electric and utility infrastructure or power reliability are not within the Commission's purview and the Commission does not have authority to regulate these issues."

Set that beside Public Resources Code section 6009, which the Legislature wrote in 2010:

"(c) Tidelands and submerged lands granted by the Legislature to local entities remain subject to the public trust, and remain subject to the oversight authority of the state by and through the State Lands Commission."

"(d) Grantees are required to manage the state's tidelands and submerged lands consistent with the terms and obligations of their grants and the public trust, without subjugation of statewide interests, concerns, or benefits to the inclination of local or municipal affairs, initiatives, or excises."

We are not lawyers and we do not claim to resolve that tension. We only note that it exists, in writing, on both sides.

What We Filed Today

Two things, both on the record.

We wrote to the Commission confirming receipt of the production, asking that item 7 be reopened in light of the FY2024-25 form it just produced, requesting the FY2022-23 and FY2023-24 forms or a statement that TIDA never filed them, and asking that all three be posted as section 6306(e)(4) requires.

We also filed written public comment for the Commission's August 25, 2026 meeting in San Diego, laying out the publication gap, the $15,101,019, and the nine years of no capital investment, and asking the Commission to obtain an accounting from its grantee.

Read The Records Yourself

Every document the State produced on August 11 is available here, unedited:

That folder contains the 3,629-page easement and Phase 3 trust-exchange file, the FY2024-25 SLC 150 and its revenue and expenditure attachment, the City's FY2024 and FY2025 annual financial reports, and outside counsel's April 2025 memorandum on the Exhibit N street-layout deviation. We encourage you to search it yourself. We would genuinely welcome being shown a page we missed.

Every figure in this post comes from a government document. Trust balances and capital-improvement answers are transcribed from TIDA's own SLC 150 forms — fiscal years 2014-15 through 2021-22 as published on the Commission's website, and fiscal year 2024-25 as produced to us on August 11, 2026. The $15,101,019 figure is the arithmetic difference between the FY2021-22 closing balance and the FY2024-25 opening balance. Quotations from the Commission's April 1 and July 16, 2026 determination letters are verbatim and both letters are on file. Statutory text of Public Resources Code §§ 6009 and 6306 and Government Code § 7922.535 was verified against leginfo.legislature.ca.gov on August 11, 2026. Keyword counts were produced by full-text extraction of all 4,258 produced pages, with per-page confirmation that every page carries a text layer. Outage counts are from this site's own incident log. This is a first-person account and the author's contention; no court or agency has adjudicated these claims.

Every path to the substance now ends in one of three answers: no records exist, we have no authority, or what exists is privileged.

On July 16, 2026, the California State Lands Commission (SLC) delivered its response to the follow-up Public Records Act request we filed on March 27, 2026 — the request we described in our March post, targeting the engineering and review records that must exist behind the utility easement changes SLC itself approved on Treasure Island trust lands. The production arrived one day ahead of the extended July 17 deadline — the State's April 1 acknowledgment had estimated June 30, later pushed to July 17 (Gov. Code § 7922.535): a three-page determination letter and two ZIP files of records.

We are still reviewing the produced records and will publish what they show. But the determination letter itself — the State's official, word-for-word position on each of the ten categories — is already a document worth reading closely. Here is the scorecard.

The Scorecard: Ten Questions, Three Kinds of Answers

Our March request asked for ten categories of records, all about the utility infrastructure on Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island trust lands from January 2022 to present. The State's answers, verbatim:

1. The easement-modification file (applications, proposals, memoranda, staff reports for the SLT UE easement changes): produced in part — "Some records have been withheld pursuant to attorney-client privilege (Ev. Code § 952, 954)."

2. Engineering reports and utility assessments submitted by TIDA, San Francisco, or their engineers: "All responsive records are attached."

3. Records explaining why new or modified utility infrastructure was required — including anything on the condition, capacity, age, or reliability of the existing electrical system: "There are no responsive records. To provide context, the State does not require new or modified utility infrastructure on Public Trust lands."

4. The plats, legals, and memorandum TIDA's counsel promised in December 2023: "All responsive records are attached."

5. Utility-infrastructure records from the Phase 1–3 trust exchange closings: "No records were found. The Commission is not involved in discussions regarding utility infrastructure conditions, and the Commission does not have authority to regulate these issues."

6. Records on the "acceptance of facilities" process for developer-built infrastructure: "No records were found."

7. The missing TIDA financial reports (SLC 150 forms for FY 2022–23, 2023–24, and 2024–25): "All responsive records were provided in response to your PRA request from January 18, 2026. There are no other responsive records."

8. SLC's own staff notes, internal memoranda, and file documentation on its review of the easement changes: produced in part — "Some records have been withheld pursuant to the attorney-client privilege (Ev. Code § 952, 954)."

9. Any correspondence between SLC and TIDA, San Francisco, or SFPUC about the condition, maintenance, upgrade, or replacement of electrical infrastructure on trust lands: "No responsive records were found."

10. Capital improvement plans, infrastructure plans, or utility master plans for the trust lands: "No responsive records were found. The Commission does not approve capital improvement plans, infrastructure development plans, or utility master plans."

And then the letter closes with this:

"In addition, Commission staff would like to further emphasize that electric and utility infrastructure or power reliability are not within the Commission's purview and the Commission does not have authority to regulate these issues."

The Privilege Wall

Look at where the attorney-client privilege landed. It was asserted in exactly two of the ten categories — numbers 1 and 8. Those are not random. They are the two categories that would show how the State actually reviewed the utility easement changes it approved: the review file itself, and SLC staff's own notes and internal memoranda about that review.

In other words: the categories that came back "no records" establish that the State never examined the grid's reliability. The categories that would reveal what the State did examine — when it signed off on moving transformers, conduits, and subsurface utilities on trust land — are the ones where records were withheld as privileged.

This outcome was signaled from the start. The State's April 1, 2026 acknowledgment letter — sent five days after the request — already warned that "the files may contain privileged materials and communications; therefore, it will be necessary to have them reviewed by Commission counsel prior to your inspection." Counsel's review then consumed the next three and a half months, and what emerged from it is a production where the State's own deliberations are the withheld part.

The privilege claim deserves scrutiny, and California law provides the tool. Under Government Code § 7922.000, "an agency shall justify withholding any record by demonstrating that the record in question is exempt under express provisions of this division." A blanket sentence — "some records have been withheld" — identifies nothing: not how many records, not their dates, not their authors, not their general subject matter. Without that, the public cannot evaluate whether the privilege actually applies to each withheld document, or whether it is being used as a catch-all.

It is also worth stating plainly: attorney-client privilege is a choice here, not a mandate. The privilege belongs to the client — the Commission — and the client can waive it. A trustee confident that its review of utility work on public trust land was rigorous could simply show its work. We have asked SLC to identify each withheld record by date, author, recipient, and general subject so the claim can be evaluated.

Four and a Half Years of Silence

Category 9 may be the most remarkable answer in the letter. We asked for any correspondence — emails, letters, anything — between the State trustee and TIDA, the City, or SFPUC about the condition, maintenance, upgrade, or replacement of electrical infrastructure on trust lands, from January 2022 to present.

The answer: "No responsive records were found."

That covers the period of the October 2025 maintenance outage that put 400–500 units on generators, the worst outage year in the itemized record (30 documented outages in 2025), and the SFPUC's own public admission that the island's legacy grid needs a $112.3 million resiliency project by 2028. Through all of it, according to this response, the state agency that holds this land in trust exchanged not a single written word with anyone about the condition of the electrical system on it.

The Financial Reports Still Don't Exist

Category 7 confirms what we flagged in March: the SLC 150 Standardized Reporting Forms that TIDA is required to file annually under Public Resources Code § 6306 remain missing for FY 2022–23, FY 2023–24, and FY 2024–25. The State says everything it has was already produced — and what it has ends at FY 2021–22, the year the trust's cumulative deficit stood at $55.9 million. Three consecutive reporting years, apparently never filed, and no indication in the response that the State has asked for them.

"Not Our Purview" — From the Agency That Approves the Transformers

The letter's closing disclaimer — that power reliability is "not within the Commission's purview" — sits directly alongside category 3's curious answer, where the State responds to a question about why infrastructure was needed by saying it "does not require new or modified utility infrastructure on Public Trust lands." That wasn't the question. The question was what the engineers and lawyers said about the condition of the existing system when they asked the State to approve changes to it.

This is the same contradiction we documented in March, now stated in the State's own official voice: the Commission reviews and approves where every transformer, conduit, and utility easement goes on Treasure Island trust lands — the December 2023 correspondence shows its staff scrutinizing eleven separate easement changes — while maintaining that whether the electrical system those easements exist to serve actually works is someone else's problem. San Francisco's Planning Department says the island's grid is "outside the scope" of its public-power project. The State says it is "not within the Commission's purview." The residents remain within the outages.

Sent as a Draft

One more detail, small but telling about the care this request received: the letter's own page headers, on pages two and three, still read "Sanders DRAFT." After 111 days and a deadline extension, the State's formal position on Treasure Island's grid went out the door marked as an unfinished document.

What Happens Next

We are reading the two ZIP files of produced records in full — every page — and will publish what they contain. We have asked the State to identify each record withheld under the privilege claims. And this response now joins the record established across 63+ records requests, two Sunshine complaints, and a grand jury complaint: at every level of government with authority over this island, the answer to "who is responsible for the grid?" is someone else — and the documents that would show otherwise are the ones marked privileged.

Quotations are verbatim from the California State Lands Commission's July 16, 2026 determination letter (signed by its Public Records Act Coordinator, cc'ing Commission counsel), on file and to be mirrored in the public records folder. Statutory text of Gov. Code § 7922.000 re-verified against leginfo.legislature.ca.gov on July 16, 2026. This is a first-person account and the author's contention; no court or agency has adjudicated these claims.

A City that actually wanted to deliver reliable power to Treasure Island would have reappointed the member fighting for it — and kept him in the chair. San Francisco did the opposite, on the record.

On June 29, 2026, the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission sent me a letter thanking me for my service and informing me that my hold-over seat on its Citizens’ Advisory Committee (CAC) had "automatically expire[d]" that day under a new ordinance — Ordinance 99-26, which added Section 5.1-5 ("Hold-Over Service") to Chapter 5 of the Administrative Code, capping hold-over service at 60 days past a term’s end.

That is the City’s clean, neutral, one-event story. It leaves out the first removal, the refused reappointment, and the timing. Set the documents side by side and a different account appears.

Two removals, not one

The seat was the second thing taken. The first was the gavel. On May 19, 2026 I was removed as Chair of the CAC Power Subcommittee — the body whose explicit charge is to review "power generation and transmission system reliability," which is, almost word for word, the Treasure Island problem. The mechanics of that removal, and the never-before-used Rules of Order clause invoked to do it, are documented in the May 19 post.

The committee’s own official agenda confirms the reassignment: by the June 9, 2026 Power Subcommittee agenda, the chair is listed as Cal Law (District 1), with me demoted to an ordinary member of District 6 — the district that actually contains Treasure Island. The gavel had already changed hands six weeks before Ordinance 99-26 existed. A law effective June 29 cannot explain a removal that happened in May. The ordinance is the cover for the second act, not the cause of the first.

I applied to stay. The City told itself I had not.

The official story needs me to be a hold-over who let his term lapse. The City’s own emails dismantle it. I applied for reappointment in January 2024, before my term even expired. The Assistant Clerk confirmed receipt in writing — "I am in receipt of your application and will provide updates via emails" — and said he would "process the nomination" once the District 6 Supervisor’s office sent a nomination letter. That letter was never sent. Not a denial, not a replacement — two and a half years of silence, which by the City’s own rule was the only thing keeping me in the seat.

Then, when the seat came open, the City told itself the opposite of the truth. In an internal staff exchange dated May 20–21, 2026 — the day after my chair was taken — a Board clerk wrote, "I don’t have any pending applications for PUC CAC for D6," and a staffer asked, "Nobody has reached out expressing interest either? I heard there was someone who had." The City possessed my application and its own confirmation of receipt, and recorded that none existed.

This is what retaliation looks like

San Francisco’s Whistleblower Protection Ordinance (Campaign and Governmental Conduct Code, Article IV, Chapter 1, Section 4.100 et seq.) prohibits an adverse action against a person for protected activity where that activity was a substantial motivating factor. "Protected activity" expressly includes complaints alleging "deficiencies in the quality and delivery of government services" and "wasteful and inefficient government practices."

That is, almost verbatim, what I had been reporting — in 63 records requests to the SFPUC since March 2025, in a Sunshine Ordinance Task Force complaint (File 26072), in a June 22 whistleblower complaint naming the SFPUC and TIDA, and in a published analysis opposing Ordinance 260302 / new Section 99.5 — the measure that would exempt SFPUC transactions from the same Chapters 6 and 21 a convicted former General Manager was jailed for violating. Within weeks of that protected activity: the chair, then the refused reappointment, then the seat.

The City will say a written decision explains none of this. When I requested every record of the decision to remove me and to replace me as chair, the Board’s office answered: "We do not have records responsive for Items 4-7." A public body’s chair changed hands and a member was removed with, the City says, no record of who decided it or why. An adverse action with no documented legitimate basis is not exonerating — it is the absence of the very thing that would rebut a retaliation claim.

The obstruction started with my records

Long before the personnel actions, the City moved against my access. On April 11, 2025 — after I had filed dozens of records requests as the Power Subcommittee Chair, during the worst outage year on record (2025 brought 30 documented outages, the most in the itemized 2015–present series) — the SFPUC invoked a "rule of reason," limiting all of my requests, pending and future, to "a limited number of hours each week."

The agency manufactured the burden it complained of. It would not provide routine post-outage reports through the Committee or directly; it required a separate formal Public Records Act request for every single event — then cited the resulting volume to cut off the oversight chair’s own access during the worst outage year on record.

Five days into that throttle, on April 16, 2025, I filed a request for "TIDA Records Relating to SFPUC/Harlan Kelly, Treasure Island, and Yerba Buena Island Utilities/Development" — asking, directly, whether the contracting misconduct that sent a former General Manager to federal prison had ever touched this grid. That throttle has since been applied to all 65 of my requests, including this month’s grid filing, and I have had to bring Sunshine Ordinance Task Force complaints (Files 26072 and 26073) to pry records loose. The sequence is consistent: as I pressed the question of corruption and Treasure Island, the City first restricted my records, and then removed my role.

What a City that wanted the lights on would have done

Strip away the procedure and ask the only question that matters. If San Francisco genuinely intended to deliver reliable power to Treasure Island under its own resources, what would it have done with the District 6 member who had spent five years demanding exactly that?

It would have reappointed him. It would have kept him in the chair of the subcommittee charged with grid reliability. It would have used his record — the 537+ documented outages since 1997, the unfunded $112.3 million resiliency project the SFPUC says it needs by 2028, the ten-year capital plan with no dedicated line for these islands — as the basis for funding the fix.

San Francisco did the opposite. It left the grid with no dedicated capital line while committing $1.234 billion to Hetch Hetchy Power. It declared, in its own February 2024 agreement, that it operates this grid "as a contractor, not as a public utility provider." And it removed the one member who refused to let any of that stand. A government’s true priorities are revealed not by what it says it values, but by who it empowers and who it removes.

The same afternoon

There is one more document, and its timestamp matters. On June 29, 2026 — the same day the removal letter arrived — the California State Lands Commission, the trustee of the public-trust land beneath Treasure Island, answered my records request by confirming it holds no record of any analysis of whether the chronic outages impair the public trust, and that it has "no duty to create a record that does not exist." The State has never asked the question. The City ended the seat of the person who kept asking it.

The open question

If Ordinance 99-26 truly swept every hold-over off every advisory body citywide, that is a fact the City can prove with a list. So on June 29 I filed Public Records Act request 26-5837 with the City Administrator, asking for every member removed as a hold-over under the ordinance, the template letter, the total citywide count, and the implementation communications. If the list is long, I was one of many, and I will say so. If it is short, "neutral and citywide" answers to a different name.

I no longer hold the seat or the chair. The roughly 500 households on Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island still hold the grid — the same 40-to-50-year-old wires the SFPUC says fail by 2028. The records requests are still pending. The Sunshine complaints are still alive. The federal critical-infrastructure case is still on file. A seat can be taken in an afternoon, and the paper explaining it can simply never be written. A public record, once filed, cannot be un-filed.

Share & Download

This account is also published as a single illustrated edition you can read, share, and save — read the illustrated edition or download the PDF.

This is a first-person account and the author’s contention, supported by the primary documents cited above and mirrored in the public records folder. References to legal standards describe the framework that governs claims of this kind; no court or agency has yet adjudicated these facts.

Treasure Island is not a future test of public power. It is the City's current test case.

San Francisco is asking the public to take seriously a major PG&E power asset acquisition project. The language is big: reliability, equity, accountability, local control, public power for all San Franciscans.

On paper, it sounds good.

But Treasure Island makes the argument uncomfortable.

The City's Draft EIR says one objective of the project is to "expand San Francisco's publicly owned, not-for-profit electricity services to meet the electricity needs of all electric customers in San Francisco." It also says the project would give the City operational control so it can provide "safe, reliable, sustainable, and affordable electricity service for all of San Francisco."

That is the promise.

Then there is Treasure Island.

Treasure Island is not simply another neighborhood waiting for the City to someday take control from PG&E. The City already has a direct utility role there. A June 2026 TIDA/SFPUC presentation says:

"SFPUC supplies the electricity used by all residents and businesses on the islands."

It also says:

"TIDA continues to contract with the SFPUC to operate and maintain the legacy electric and natural gas systems."

For those legacy systems, SFPUC says it:

And the same presentation says:

"TIDA continues to own the legacy electrical. Properties in these areas are TIDA utility customers."

So Treasure Island is the awkward proof point. The City is arguing that local control will produce reliability. But on Treasure Island, the City already has local control through TIDA and SFPUC, and the island has lived through years of repeated outages.

This is not a theoretical concern. SFPUC's own public statement says the agency and TIDA installed near-term measures "to improve power reliability on Treasure Island." The stated purpose included limiting outage duration, reducing the number of customers affected, improving restoration times, and reducing the time needed to identify, diagnose, and repair outages. Supervisor Matt Haney was quoted in that same release saying:

"Power outages have plagued Treasure Island residents for years..."

So the City knows. It has known.

The comment, and the answer

That is why I submitted a comment asking the Planning Commission to address Treasure Island directly in the PG&E Power Asset Acquisition EIR. I wrote:

"Over the past 25+ years, Treasure Island has experienced more than 508 power outages — an average of one every 2-3 weeks."

I asked the City to declare Treasure Island a Critical Grid Failure Zone, produce a grid reliability and cost analysis, and include Treasure Island as a case study in the Final EIR.

The response was not a reliability plan.

It was this:

"Regarding Comment I-Sanders.1, as noted on page 1-16 in Chapter 1, Introduction, of the Draft EIR, the acquisition of Treasure Island's electrical grid is not currently part of the project or project variant and therefore is outside the scope of the environmental review for this project."

That sentence is the whole story.

The City wants the public to believe that acquiring PG&E assets will create reliable, accountable public power. But when asked to address the neighborhood where the City already has a direct utility role, the answer was: not this project.

The hole in the logic

That does not mean the PG&E acquisition is automatically bad. It means the City's logic has a hole in it.

If public ownership and local control are the solution, why is the City not first proving that on Treasure Island?

If the City can mobilize lawyers, planners, consultants, engineers, hearings, environmental review, and political messaging for PG&E's grid, why can't it mobilize the same seriousness for the grid serving Treasure Island residents right now?

If Treasure Island is outside the scope of this project, then what project is it inside?

Because residents do not live "outside the scope." They live with the outages.

Sources, re-verified June 25, 2026: SF Planning, PG&E Power Asset Acquisition Draft EIR and Final EIR Responses to Comments (Response GC-4), via sfplanning.org/sfceqadocs; the TI/YBI Electricity Service Presentation (June 2026); and the SFPUC release on near-term Treasure Island reliability measures.

San Francisco already runs an electric grid. It is on Treasure Island — and the City never mentions it.

There is a good article making the rounds. KQED's "San Francisco has been trying to leave PG&E for 100 years — will this time be different?" lays out the City's case for public power cleanly, in the City's own voice.

The case goes like this: PG&E cannot be trusted with the grid. A December 2025 substation fire knocked out power for three days. Rates are up roughly 70% since 2020. So the City is bidding about $3.4 billion (reported April 2026) to buy PG&E's electric assets and run them itself — and in February 2026 the Board of Supervisors reaffirmed the plan to leave PG&E. The promise: public power will be more reliable, and 15–20% cheaper.

Read the whole article. Then notice what is not in it.

The City already runs a grid

San Francisco does not have to imagine whether it can run an electric grid. It already runs one — and has for nearly thirty years.

The SFPUC operates the electric distribution system on Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island. That is not an inference; it is the SFPUC's own words. In a public release, the agency states that the SFPUC is responsible for maintaining and operating Treasure and Yerba Buena Islands' power infrastructure. That same release notes the infrastructure is roughly 40 to 50 years old — against a typical design lifespan of 25 to 30 years.

So when the City argues that public ownership means reliable power, there is a test case sitting in the middle of the Bay. How is it going?

The contrast

Here is the City's argument, and here is the City's record, side by side.

What the City says about PG&E: PG&E is unreliable — a December 2025 substation fire caused a three-day outage; rates are up ~70% since 2020; the City is bidding $3.4B to take over the grid on a reliability pitch; public power is promised 15–20% cheaper; and the Board reaffirmed leaving PG&E in February 2026.

What the City does on Treasure Island: the SFPUC owns and operates the TI/YBI grid (its own words); the infrastructure is 40–50 years old against a 25–30-year design life (the SFPUC admits this); a reported ~30 outages in 2025 (a decade high); a reported 538+ outages since 1997 (roughly one every two to three weeks); and South Treasure Island went dark again in February 2026 — the same month the Board reaffirmed leaving PG&E.

A note on honesty, because it matters: the outage counts — about 30 in 2025, 538+ since 1997, several times the citywide average — come from public reporting and from this community's own tracking. They are well-sourced, but not yet confirmed against the SFPUC's primary outage log. That is exactly why one of the open records requests below asks the SFPUC for that log. What is not in question, because it is the SFPUC's own statement: the City operates this grid, the equipment is well past its expected life, and South Treasure Island lost power again in February 2026.

The promise that came due in January 2021

Here is the cleanest example of the gap between what the City says and what it delivers — and it is entirely the City's own paper trail.

In July 2020, the SFPUC publicly announced near-term measures to improve Treasure Island's reliability, including a new switchyard and switchgear expected by January 2021 to isolate outages, so a fault in one area would not darken the whole island.

January 2021 came and went. By the reported count, 2025 was the worst year on record for Treasure Island outages — and in February 2026, South Treasure Island went dark again, in the same month the Board reaffirmed spending billions to take over PG&E's grid on the strength of a reliability argument.

Was the switchyard built? Energized? Effective? Quietly dropped? The City has the answer in its own files. One of the records requests below asks for exactly that.

Why the omission is the story

The municipalization bid buys PG&E's assets. Treasure Island is not PG&E's — it is already public. So the City's own operating record, the one piece of direct evidence about how San Francisco actually runs an electric grid, sits structurally outside the frame of the "public power = reliability" campaign.

That is not an argument that PG&E is good. It is an argument that the City is making a competence claim while leaving its only competence record out of the conversation. Before ratepayers commit $3.4 billion, that record deserves to be on the table.

What we are doing about it

We have filed (or are preparing to file) a set of public records requests and accountability actions designed so that any answer is informative: if the records exist, they are the contrast in the City's own hand; if they do not, "the City does not keep records on its own failing grid while bidding $3.4B to run PG&E's" is its own finding.

We will publish what comes back — including silence.

Sources: KQED, "San Francisco has been trying to leave PG&E for 100 years"; the SFPUC's own release on near-term Treasure Island reliability measures; and Hoodline's February 2026 report on the latest South Treasure Island outage. The outage figures attributed as "reported" (~30 in 2025; 538+ since 1997; ~4x the citywide average) come from public reporting and community tracking and are pending confirmation against the SFPUC's primary outage log, which is the subject of an open records request. The SFPUC's operation of the grid, the age of the infrastructure, and the February 2026 outage are drawn from the SFPUC's own statements and contemporaneous reporting.

$285 million for a Sierra penstock. $0 for the 40-year-old grid the City forces 500 island households to live on.

San Francisco doesn't have a capability problem on Treasure Island. It has a priority problem — and the City's own documents prove it.

$285M for Moccasin. $0 for Treasure Island’s grid.

The SFPUC’s FY2024-25 to FY2033-34 Capital Plan commits $285 million to replace the Moccasin penstock, part of $1.23 billion in total Hetch Hetchy Power capital. In that same plan, Treasure Island’s only line item is a $40.9 million wastewater plant. For the island’s electrical grid — the one SFPUC operates and TIDA owns — there is no capital line at all. (Confirmed by a full text search of the plan: zero co-occurrences of "Treasure" with electric, power, grid, switchgear, feeder, or generator.)

Nobody is actually the utility

Under the Amended & Restated TIDA-SFPUC Memorandum of Understanding (Feb 14, 2024), the SFPUC operates the island’s electrical system "as a contractor, not as a public utility provider." TIDA owns the legacy grid; SFPUC runs it under contract and bills for the power. So when the lights go out, there is no accountable public utility — only a contract and a funding constraint.

The structural trap

Under the Treasure Island Infrastructure Plan (Exhibit FF, §13.1.3.3), the old grid is replaced only in the "minimum necessary to serve the Sub-Phase," and the SFPUC takes ownership only when a sub-phase is complete and accepted. Translation: residents in legacy areas like Gateview — the SFPUC’s own September 2025 briefing names Gateview as the source of recent outages — stay on 40-to-50-year-old equipment (lifespan: 25-30 years) until private redevelopment reaches them. That could be a decade or more.

They know how to move fast — when they want to

In 2017, the City emergency-procured two replacement generators for Treasure Island for $1,660,050. The General Manager declared the emergency under Administrative Code §21.15(c) on May 11; the Board ratified it 11-0 on July 25 (Resolution 307-17). The failed generators were from 1989 and "beyond their useful life." The machinery for fast action on this grid exists — it simply hasn’t been pointed at the legacy system the residents actually live on.

The records trail shows the gap

The City’s own public records portal confirms there is no accountability paper being produced: a request for TI electrical-grid financial records (NextRequest 26-3518) closed with "no responsive records in our custody or control," and a request on TIDA’s liabilities (NextRequest 25-1383) closed because the Controller "no longer has records pertaining to TIDA."

The ask

1. Transfer the TI/YBI legacy electrical system from TIDA to the SFPUC.

2. Fund a dedicated reliability capital line — the way Moccasin is funded.

3. Declare the emergency the February 2026 four-day blackout already was, under the same §21.15(c) authority the City used in 2017.

Sources (all public): SFPUC FY25-34 Capital Plan; TIDA-SFPUC A&R MOU (2/14/2024); TI Infrastructure Plan Exhibit FF; SF Board File 170649 / Resolution 307-17; SFPUC "Overview of TI/YBI Electricity Service" (9/10/2025); SF NextRequest 26-3518 and 25-1383.

They removed the chair seat. They cannot remove the record.

This week the SFPUC Citizens' Advisory Committee removed me as Chair of the Power Subcommittee.

I'll tell you the rest in a minute, but lead with the headline: the body whose entire purpose is to oversee the SFPUC's electric system removed the only CAC member who has ever actually lived on the part of that system the agency itself owns and operates end-to-end — and where the lights go out four times more often than anywhere else in San Francisco.

Quick housekeeping on titles, because they matter here. The SFPUC is governed by a five-seat Commission appointed by the Mayor — I am not on it. The body I sit on is the SFPUC Citizens' Advisory Committee (CAC), a separate seventeen-seat advisory body created under SF Administrative Code § 5.140–5.142. I am the District 6 appointee to the CAC. Until this week I was also Chair of its Power Subcommittee. I am still the D6 appointee. I am no longer the Power Subcommittee Chair. Whether I remain a member of the Power Subcommittee — separate from the chair role — is one of the things the records request is going to clarify.

I want to walk you through how we got here.

What this site exists to prove

If you've spent any time on this site, you already know the numbers. The home-page chart counts 30 documented outages on Treasure Island in 2025 — the highest in a decade. 537 outages since 1997. An outage every two to three weeks. Four times the citywide average.

These numbers aren't activism. They are SFPUC's own alerts, AlertSF push notifications, and resident reports, logged into a public timeline that anyone can read.

This is what an oversight record looks like when an agency won't keep one itself.

Why I built this from inside the room

I'm the District 6 appointee to the SFPUC Citizens' Advisory Committee. I'm a former Treasure Island resident — I lived on the island and rode out the outages from inside the housing the SFPUC and TIDA grid serves. When the power went out, I didn't read about it later. I was the one walking down a dark hallway hoping the medicine in the fridge would survive one more cycle.

That is, as far as I have been able to determine, a first in the history of the Power Subcommittee. The SFPUC has been delivering electricity to Treasure Island since before the Navy handed the island over. In all that time, the seat tasked with overseeing power generation, transmission, and reliability had never been held by someone who had actually lived under the grid it was overseeing.

That changed when I was appointed Chair.

I built this site — and I keep building it — because the gap between what the agency tells the public and what residents experience is too wide to bridge with anything other than a public record. The 2025 chart you see on the home page didn't come from the SFPUC. It came from organizing AlertSF alerts, neighbor reports, and a stack of CPRA responses into something you can scroll.

The lead-up: tonight's CAC meeting

Tonight, May 19, 2026, the full CAC met. Item 5 on the agenda is the one that mattered: Interconnection Issues with PG&E & Public Power Expansion Update. The pitch is the one SFPUC has been making for a year — PG&E is the obstacle, the City should take over the grid citywide, public power is the answer.

I had questions ready. Seven of them.

The first was supposed to lock in a single fact: Treasure Island is the only part of San Francisco where SFPUC already owns and operates the entire distribution system, with no PG&E involvement. Staff will confirm this if asked plainly — they have published it themselves.

The second question was supposed to make staff name our SAIDI and SAIFI — System Average Interruption Duration Index and System Average Interruption Frequency Index, the two reliability metrics every utility in America tracks. Mine. Yours. PG&E's. The point of those numbers is comparison. If we never publish them, we never have to compare.

The rest of the questions were about the February 14, 2025 Valentine's Day collapse — approximately 400 units, four days without heat or hot water in winter — the Capital Financing Plan timeline for the new switchyard, the equity profile of TI residents (predominantly low-income, with formerly homeless households at One Treasure Island and veterans at Maceo May), and a final ask: would staff commit, before the next meeting, to producing a Treasure Island Reliability Report?

I never asked them.

The removal

I was removed as Chair of the Power Subcommittee before the meeting.

There's something quietly important about how that was done, and it's worth understanding the mechanics if you're going to read the rest of this site with the right eyes.

San Francisco Administrative Code § 5.141(e) — the law that creates the CAC's subcommittees — says this, verbatim:

"The chair of the Public Utilities Citizen's Advisory Committee shall appoint a chair for each subcommittee, and shall assign members to serve on each subcommittee."

Subcommittee chairs are not elected. They are appointed by one person — the Chair of the full CAC. By extension, under Robert's Rules of Order (which § 5.141(h) binds us to follow), the same person can remove a subcommittee chair without a vote.

No public deliberation. No agendized item. No roll call.

I am not saying the action was unlawful on its face. I am saying the structure of the rule is exactly the structure that lets accountability disappear without a footprint. And I have filed a public records request to find out exactly how, when, and why this decision was made — including whether a vote of any kind occurred and whether it complied with notice requirements under the Brown Act and Sunshine Ordinance.

That request is public. Track it at NextRequest 26-4414. By statute the agency has ten days to respond substantively. Responses will be published in the public Treasure Island Records Drive folder and indexed under the Records Tracker on this site.

What the noticed agendas actually show

I went back through every CAC and Power Subcommittee agenda and minutes the SFPUC has published in 2026. Here is what the public record establishes about when the Power Subcommittee Chair role could have been changed in compliance with notice law — and when it could not.

April 28, 2026 (Full CAC Special Meeting). The agenda noticed, under Item 4 Report from the Chair, a sub-bullet captioned "Subcommittee Chair Appointments". The draft minutes for that meeting record that Chair Jacuzzi announced two appointments in open session: "Erin Roach is appointed Wastewater Subcommittee Chair and Aaron Hebert is appointed Water Subcommittee Chair." The Power Subcommittee Chair was not named. I was absent from that meeting — listed by name in the roll call ("ABSENT (5): Roach, Sanders, Nagengast, Baker, Atkinson").

April 28 → May 19 (no qualifying meetings). There was no Full CAC meeting between April 28 and tonight; the April 21 meeting had already been cancelled and rolled into the April 28 special meeting. The Power Subcommittee meets the second Tuesday of even-numbered months; April 14 was the last one, June 9 would be the next. No public meeting at which my Power Subcommittee Chair role could have been changed on a noticed agenda occurred in that window.

Tonight (May 19, 2026, Full CAC). Item 4 Report from the Chair on tonight's noticed agenda includes only Welcome members, staff, and the public and Ohlone Tribal Land Acknowledgement. There is no "Subcommittee Chair Appointments" sub-bullet tonight. Whatever change has been made to the Power Subcommittee Chair role since April 28 has not been added to the public agenda the public was given 72 hours to read.

Two clean readings of these facts are possible. Either (a) the Power Subcommittee Chair role remained mine through April 28 and was changed at some point after, off any agenda, with no public-meeting disclosure since; or (b) the change was made before April 28 and was deliberately omitted from the same agenda item that announced the Water and Wastewater changes. The records request will resolve which.

Under San Francisco Administrative Code § 5.141(e) the Chair of the CAC has the authority to appoint subcommittee chairs. The agency, on April 28, treated that authority as the kind of action that should be announced under a noticed agenda item. Doing it that way for Water and Wastewater, and not for Power, is inconsistent enough to warrant a paper-trail.

The irony, said out loud

The SFPUC has spent the last year telling San Franciscans that the city should take over the entire electric grid because PG&E is unaccountable. The argument is that public ownership produces public accountability.

Treasure Island is the proof of concept. It is the one place where San Francisco already runs the whole system. No PG&E. No private monopoly. Pure municipal operation.

And it is the worst-performing power grid in the city by a factor of four.

If public ownership produced accountability, you would not need a resident to build a website to count the outages. You would not need a resident on the oversight committee to spend a year preparing questions the staff are paid to answer voluntarily. You would not need to remove that member from a chair role on the eve of those questions being asked.

I am not arguing PG&E is the good guy. The interconnection delays are real; the costs to San Francisco are real. The point is sharper than that: if the agency cannot keep the lights on for 2,500 customers across 125 buildings — less than 0.1% of the city — it has not earned the right to be trusted with 900,000.

And if the agency's first response to the CAC member asking the question is to remove him from the chair seat where he was asking it, that is not accountability. That is its opposite.

What happens next

A few things, all of them public.

1. The records request. NextRequest 26-4414 covers every communication, every meeting note, every legal memo, and every internal email connected to the decision to remove me. By statute the agency has ten days to respond substantively. Responses will be published on the Records Tracker and in the public Drive folder.

2. The questions don't disappear. I am still the District 6 appointee to the full CAC. The Power Subcommittee chair seat was a procedural amplifier — losing it does not lose the questions. SAIDI and SAIFI for Treasure Island versus PG&E San Francisco is a question that has an answer; the agency either produces it or doesn't. I will ask it again in writing, on the record, until they do.

3. The site continues. Every outage gets logged. Every alert gets archived. Every CPRA response gets posted. If the agency wants to remove the chair, fine. They cannot remove the record.

4. The Brown Act demand — now filed. On May 19, 2026 I sent a written demand to cure or correct under California Government Code § 54960.1 to the Citizens’ Advisory Committee at cac@sfwater.org, with a copy to the SFPUC Commission Secretary at Commission@sfwater.org. The demand is protective and conditional: it challenges any action the Committee took, as a legislative body, to remove or replace the Power Subcommittee Chair without the notice the Brown Act requires — whether at the April 28, 2026 special meeting (governed by Government Code § 54956) or outside any noticed meeting. Under § 54960.1(e), the Committee has 30 days from receipt to cure or correct the action, or to state in writing that it will not. If the records request shows the change was instead a unilateral act of the CAC Chair under Administrative Code § 5.141(e), the demand asks the Committee to say so in writing and identify the document that effected it. Either answer goes on the record.

To my neighbors

To everyone reading this on Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island:

I am not going anywhere. I am still the District 6 appointee to the SFPUC Citizens' Advisory Committee. The Power Subcommittee chair seat changed hands this week; the seat at the full CAC table did not. The thirty outages last year were not a glitch — they were a structure, and the structure has a name, and the name has a budget, and the budget has a timeline that this committee was set up to review. I intend to keep reviewing it.

If you've had an outage and haven't reported it, report it here. The site is yours. Every entry strengthens the record.

If you want the agency to be accountable, the most useful thing you can do is what they cannot remove: tell the story of what actually happens when the power goes out.

I'll keep doing my part. Thank you for doing yours.

Update — May 25, 2026: Research findings and a second CPRA filed

Six days after the removal, here is what the public record now shows about Rules of Order § VII(a) — the clause that authorized it — and how often it has been used before. The short answer: § VII(a) is not new, and there is no public-record evidence of it ever being used before.

The § VII(a) unilateral-removal clause is not new — it has existed in the SFPUC CAC Rules of Order since the original 3/21/2005 adoption. I confirmed this by comparing the pre-amendment version of the Rules of Order (captured by the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine on December 3, 2024) against the current post-amendment version on the SFPUC site. Section VII(a) — "Each subcommittee chair shall have a term of twelve months, and can be removed and replaced by the Committee Chair at any time within the twelve-month term" — is identical in both versions. The clause has been in the Rules of Order, untouched, for at least twenty-one years.

The February 18, 2025 amendment touched only Section VI (Duties of Officers), not Section VII (Subcommittees). Per the February 18, 2025 Full CAC minutes, "The amendment to the CAC Rules of Order section VI was approved without objection." Whatever else has been said about the Rules of Order being recently amended, the subcommittee-chair-removal authority was not what was amended. The redlined version of what changed in Section VI is one of the records the new CPRA seeks.

Across all 120 publicly-posted SFPUC CAC and subcommittee minutes and agendas from January 2021 through May 2026, zero prior instances of a CAC Chair removing or replacing a subcommittee chair mid-term appear. Every prior subcommittee chair change in the public record occurred at the biennial officer-election meeting (every even-numbered year, January or February), with the new chair publicly named at that meeting. The known historical Power Subcommittee chairs reconstructible from the public minutes archive are Mark Tang (2019), Moises Garcia (2020), Emily Algire (2023), and me (2026 — removed May 19, 2026). None of the prior three were removed mid-term; each was succeeded at a normal biennial election cycle.

The April 28, 2026 Full CAC agenda explicitly agendized "Subcommittee Chair Appointments" as a noticed item. Water and Wastewater chairs were named publicly under that item, on the record. Power was skipped. I was absent from that meeting, per the roll call.

The May 19, 2026 Full CAC agenda has no "Subcommittee Chair Appointments" line item at all. Item 6 still refers to "Member Clary, Water CAC Chair" — silence on Power. There was no agendized public action point at which a removal of the Power Subcommittee Chair could have been deliberated, voted on, or announced under the Brown Act on May 19. Whatever happened to the Power Subcommittee Chair role between April 28 and May 19, it did not happen on a noticed agenda.

The SFPUC website only publishes CAC agendas and minutes from 2021 onward. The CAC was established in 2002. Twenty years of records — every prior officer election, every prior subcommittee assignment, every prior potential use of § VII(a) — are not online. They exist somewhere (paper, microfilm, archived electronic files, departmental records-retention storage), and the new CPRA seeks them.

The second CPRA — NextRequest 26-4613

Today, May 25, 2026, I filed a second public records request to SFPUC specifically targeting the historical use of the CAC Chair's authority to appoint, replace, or remove subcommittee chairs. The request asks for: a full roster of every CAC subcommittee chair since 2002 with appointment and end dates; every prior instance of mid-term subcommittee chair removal or replacement (the § VII(a) authority); all CAC Chair / SFPUC staff correspondence about subcommittee chair changes; every version of the Rules of Order including the original 2005 adoption and every amendment; the redlined version of the February 18, 2025 amendment; and the pre-2021 CAC archive in whatever form it exists.

Track the new request at NextRequest 26-4613. By statute SFPUC has ten days to respond substantively. As with 26-4414, responses will be published in the public Treasure Island Records Drive folder and indexed under the Records Tracker.

What this changes about the original post

Nothing in the original May 19 post is withdrawn. The § VII(a) clause does exist, was on the books before this week, and is, on its face, the legal basis someone could cite. The new finding does not unmake the rule. What it does is sharpen the question: a clause that has been available to every CAC Chair for twenty-one years, used (as far as the public record shows) by exactly one of them, used the week the Power Subcommittee Chair was about to put Treasure Island reliability on the record. That is not a finding of fact. It is the question the new records request exists to answer.

The questions still don't disappear. The record still stands. The site still keeps counting.

Sources for the May 25 update

Read the source documents yourself

Verification standard

Every outage number in this post is documented on the home-page chart of this site, sourced from SFPUC POWER ENTERPRISE ALERT distribution, AlertSF push notifications, and resident reports. The quotation of San Francisco Administrative Code § 5.141(e) is verbatim from the city's Rich Text Format copy of Chapter 5 of the Administrative Code (sfgov.org/sfc, fetched May 19, 2026) and cross-checked against the American Legal Publishing code library. The agenda item references are verbatim from the May 19, 2026 full CAC agenda linked above. No allegation in this post that the removal was unlawful is made as a finding of fact; the records request exists precisely so that determination can be made on the documents, not on opinion.

Update — May 25, 2026 (evening): Allegedly violated laws

The May 19, 2026 removal procedure appears to have potentially violated multiple California and San Francisco open-meeting laws. The Committee was served on or about May 19, 2026 with a Brown Act demand under California Government Code § 54960.1 (cited in the original post above). This analysis lays out each statute the procedure may have run afoul of. All claims below are alleged. None has yet been adjudicated.

1. California Brown Act § 54954.2(a) — 72-hour agenda posting and prohibition on undisclosed action. The Ralph M. Brown Act (Cal. Gov. Code § 54950 et seq.) governs all "legislative bodies" of California local agencies, which expressly includes advisory committees created by ordinance (§ 54952(b)). The SFPUC CAC was created by S.F. Admin. Code §§ 5.140–5.142 — formal action of the Board of Supervisors — making it a Brown Act legislative body. § 54954.2(a) requires the agenda for a regular meeting to be posted at least 72 hours in advance and contain a brief general description of each item of business. The statute states in operative language: "No action or discussion shall be undertaken on any item not appearing on the posted agenda." The May 19, 2026 Full CAC agenda contains no item referencing Power Subcommittee chair appointments, removals, or any change in subcommittee leadership. If the May 19 chair change is characterized as action of the legislative body (rather than as the Chair's individual administrative act), this allegedly violates § 54954.2(a). Source: leginfo.legislature.ca.gov.

2. S.F. Sunshine Ordinance § 67.7 — meaningful description standard (stricter than state law). Under § 67.7, agenda descriptions must be "meaningful" — defined in the ordinance as "sufficiently clear and specific to alert a person of average intelligence and education whose interests are affected by the item that he or she may have reason to attend the meeting or seek more information on the item." This standard is stricter than the Brown Act's "brief general description." The May 19 agenda contained zero items satisfying this standard regarding subcommittee leadership. Source: codelibrary.amlegal.com.

3. California Brown Act § 54960.1 — cure-and-correct mechanism. Under § 54960.1, a person who alleges a Brown Act violation may make a written demand that the body cure or correct the action. The demand must be made within 90 days of the alleged violation (30 days for § 54954.2 violations in open session). The body has 30 days to cure or correct or notify the demanding party in writing of its decision not to cure. If the body fails or refuses to cure, the demanding party has 15 days to file suit to nullify the action. A demand under this section has been filed (referenced in the original post above) and the 30-day cure window is currently running. Source: leginfo.legislature.ca.gov.

4. S.F. Sunshine Ordinance § 67.30 — Sunshine Ordinance Task Force complaint. Under § 67.30, the Sunshine Ordinance Task Force ("SOTF") investigates alleged violations of the Sunshine Ordinance, the Brown Act, and the California Public Records Act, and may make referrals to enforcement bodies including the City Attorney, District Attorney, and Ethics Commission. A SOTF complaint may be filed independent of the § 54960.1 cure-and-correct demand. Source: codelibrary.amlegal.com.

5. S.F. Sunshine Ordinance § 67.34 — willful failure is official misconduct. § 67.34 provides that "the willful failure of any elected official, department head, or other managerial city employee to discharge any duties imposed by the Sunshine Ordinance, the Brown Act or the Public Records Act shall be deemed official misconduct." Whether this provision extends to CAC officers (who are appointed, not elected) or to managerial staff at the SFPUC who liaise with the CAC is an open question. To the extent any "managerial city employee" knowingly facilitated a non-agendized action that affected the CAC's structure, this provision could be implicated. Source: codelibrary.amlegal.com.

6. First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the First Amendment, public officials may not retaliate against members of public bodies for protected speech on matters of public concern. (Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).) The U.S. Supreme Court's 2022 decision in Houston Community College Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468 (2022), narrowed this principle in the specific context of a verbal censure of an elected board member — but the Court did not foreclose claims where a covert action without stated cause deprives a member of an official leadership position because of their speech on a matter of public concern. The Power Subcommittee Chair seat carries oversight of Treasure Island power infrastructure. The Chair publishes treasureislandsfpoweroutages.com and is one of the most public voices on the issue. The May 19, 2026 removal occurred without stated cause, without agenda notice, and without a vote. These facts allegedly support a colorable First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 distinguishable from Wilson. Source: supreme.justia.com.

7. CAC Rules of Order §§ VII(a) and IX — the CAC's own internal bylaws. The CAC's Rules of Order, Section IX, provides: "Agendas and notices of all Committee and subcommittee meetings will be posted at the meeting site, the San Francisco Main Library, and on the Commission's website. All such activities are conducted in accordance with applicable open meeting laws and regulations." Section VII(a) provides that "Meetings of the subcommittees shall be noticed and conducted in the same manner as Committee meetings." A change in Power Subcommittee leadership, effected without notice at either the Full CAC or a Power Subcommittee meeting, may have violated the CAC's own internal rules. Source: sfpuc.gov.

Disclaimer. Each item above is an allegation, not an adjudicated finding. No court, agency, the Sunshine Ordinance Task Force, the City Attorney, or the Ethics Commission has yet determined whether any of these provisions was violated. This post is presented for transparency about the legal landscape surrounding the May 19, 2026 procedure, not as legal advice. Nothing here is intended to make any false or misleading factual claim about any individual; all conclusions about whether a violation actually occurred remain for the relevant tribunal or body to decide on the facts and record.

We asked for the records that exist about whether SFPUC is policed. The Controller picked up the phone.

What was released

Twenty-three records compiled by the Controller's Office responsive to the requester's consolidated ask for everything the office holds on SFPUC Public Integrity reviews and audits. The full production has been uploaded to NextRequest 25-2837 by the Controller and is mirrored — request text, agency correspondence, and produced records — in the public Treasure Island Records Drive folder.

These records sit alongside the Controller's separate disclosure that the office runs its NextRequest account via a direct work-order contract with the SF Department of Technology, at the following annual cost: FY23 $664 · FY24 $664 · FY25 $717.81 · FY26 $739.34. NextRequest is the same system every San Francisco department uses to process public-records requests. The cost line is small, but it is the first time we've seen the actual dollar figure documented in writing.

➡️ Track the request at NextRequest 25-2837

➡️ Read the records (public Drive folder)

Why this matters for Treasure Island

The reason a Treasure Island Power Watch sends records requests to the Controller's Office — and not just to SFPUC — is that the Controller is the city body charged with auditing SFPUC. The 2023 federal indictment and 2023 conviction of former SFPUC General Manager Harlan Kelly Jr. (covered in our April 15 post on Ordinance File 260302 / Section 99.5) was followed by a joint set of recommendations from the City Controller, City Attorney, and Ethics Commission to strengthen procurement oversight at the SFPUC. The records released this week are the paper trail of what has and has not actually been done since.

We are not, in this post, drawing legal conclusions from those 23 records. They are released; they are public; readers can review them. We are publishing them as part of the Records Tracker that now lives at the top of this site — every CPRA, FOIA, and Sunshine request filed in the Treasure Island grid investigation, with status, links to the agency's portal, and a link to the public Drive folder that holds the request text and any produced records.

How the Controller delivered

On April 15, 2026, Claire Stone (they/them), Government Affairs & Executive Operations Manager in the Controller's Executive Office, emailed proactively to ask why three requests appeared stalled. They identified each by NextRequest number, suggested the correct routing for the ones that belonged to a different department, and offered to deliver the SFPUC-integrity records by direct email if the portal was difficult to use.

On May 7, 2026, after the requester confirmed which records were still outstanding, the Controller's Office delivered the 23 SFPUC Public Integrity records by direct email and through NextRequest 25-2837. The full chain — initial outreach, requester reply, delivery — is preserved in the public Drive folder linked above.

This is what compliance looks like. It does not require a Sunshine Ordinance Task Force complaint. It does not require briefing, a hearing, or an Order of Determination. It requires an agency that picks up the phone and produces the records it has.

We are noting this because the contrast with how the SFPUC has handled the seventeen outage requests now consolidated under Sunshine Ordinance Task Force File 26072 is stark — and is, in itself, evidence in that case. SFPUC has, in writing, declared it "will now invoke the rule of reason" and "generally will not be able to comply with the response deadlines set out in the Sunshine Ordinance and the Public Records Act." The Controller's Office, asked for records on a closely related topic, produced 23 of them in three weeks.

What's next

We expect the next significant agency response by 2026-05-28, the next regular meeting of the Sunshine Ordinance Task Force, when File 26072 (SFPUC nonproduction on outage records) and File 26073 (City Attorney nonproduction on records about Ordinance File 260302) are expected to be calendared. Records Tracker entries for both are linked from the top-of-site Records tab.

In the meantime, the public-integrity records released this week are available for anyone to read. If something in them changes our understanding of the Treasure Island grid story, we will say so on this blog, on the record, with the source documents linked.

Read the source documents yourself

Verification standard

Every dollar figure in this post (NextRequest contract costs FY23-FY26) is quoted verbatim from Claire Stone's May 7, 2026 email on behalf of the Controller's Office and is preserved in the Drive folder linked above. The count of 23 records is the count delivered by the Controller; the count of seventeen outage requests under SOTF File 26072 is taken from SFPUC's own index (Attachment B to its May 12, 2026 SOTF response). No characterization in this post is asserted as a finding of fact about SFPUC corruption, past or ongoing; the records released are made available so readers can form their own conclusions.

If responding to records requests feels burdensome to SFPUC, imagine being the people whose lights keep going out.

Read the source documents

SFPUC's full May 12, 2026 response (PDF, 4 MB) — the agency's complete filing in its own words: a 4-page letter from Custodian of Records Chloe Noonan plus Attachments A through E (92 pages total). Attachment A is the April 11, 2025 "Rule of Reason" letter. Attachment B is SFPUC's own index of every records request the agency has received from this requester since 2024. Attachments C, D, E are the agency's prior briefing to the Task Force on the rule-of-reason topic.

➡️ Read SFPUC's response (PDF)

A side-by-side public reading (magazine PDF, ~460 KB) — a nine-spread editorial reading of the SFPUC response, with statutes quoted verbatim and all SFPUC quotations reproduced from the agency's own filings. Every source URL is included. Spreads 01–07 are fact-only. Spread 08 ("The PG&E Framing") is labeled editorial.

➡️ Read the Magazine (PDF)

What the agency argued — and what its own documents say

SFPUC's response builds on four arguments. Each is summarized below in the agency's framing, then placed beside the agency's own documents.

1. "The complainant misstated the section numbers."

SFPUC's response devotes its first page to the argument that the complaint mislabels the subsections of San Francisco Administrative Code § 67.25. The agency does not, however, claim that the underlying conduct alleged — production of zero substantive records on seventeen outage requests over thirteen months — complies with the Sunshine Ordinance. The conduct independently violates SF Admin Code § 67.21(b), § 67.25(d), § 67.26, § 67.27, and Cal. Gov. Code §§ 7922.000, 7922.530(a), and 7922.535(a). Sources: sfgov.org Article III; leginfo.legislature.ca.gov § 7922.535.

2. "*Haynie v. Superior Court* means we don't have to create a withholding log."

Haynie v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1061 concerned the scope of an agency's search obligation, not deadline compliance. The case stands for a "rule of reason" applied to the search effort. It does not authorize an agency to ignore the ten-day determination deadline in Cal. Gov. Code § 7922.535(a), nor does it relieve the agency of the affirmative duty to justify each withholding under § 7922.000. SFPUC has produced no per-record withholding citations for the seventeen outage requests because it has produced no records.

3. "We have never 'denied' any request."

The California Public Records Act treats failure to meet the statutory deadline as a denial. Cal. Gov. Code § 7922.535(a) sets a ten-day deadline. Subsection (b) allows one extension of no more than fourteen days in "unusual circumstances." Anything beyond that is, by operation of statute, a constructive denial. And the clearest evidence of what SFPUC has actually decided to do is in SFPUC's own April 11, 2025 letter:

"Due to the burdens your requests have placed on the SFPUC… we will now invoke the rule of reason… We will therefore allocate a limited number of hours per week responding to your requests. We generally will not be able to comply with the response deadlines set out in the Sunshine Ordinance and the Public Records Act." — SFPUC Public Records letter, April 11, 2025 (Attachment A to SFPUC's May 12, 2026 SOTF response)

4. "Rule of Reason — your requests are too burdensome."

The Public Records Act already addresses the volume problem. Section 7922.535(b) caps "unusual circumstances" extensions at fourteen days. SFPUC's "limited hours per week" regime has been operating for thirteen months — roughly twenty-eight times the maximum extension the legislature authorized. The Sunshine Ordinance expressly states: "No record shall be withheld from disclosure in its entirety unless all information contained in it is exempt." (§ 67.26.) Volume is not an exemption.

Additionally, on April 15, 2026, the requester filed NextRequest 26-3087 as a master consolidation request specifically designed to reduce volume. SFPUC declined to consolidate, characterizing consolidation as "only increas[ing] administrative burden" in its May 12 response.

The PG&E framing (opinion)

This section is opinion, plainly labeled. SFPUC's public communications routinely use PG&E as a contrast device — its commissioners comment on PG&E enforcement actions; the agency issues press releases on its own renewable-energy targets in contradistinction to the investor-owned utility's mix.

None of that applies to Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island. On those islands, SFPUC's Hetch Hetchy Power Enterprise is the electrical utility. The 2017 emergency declaration to replace the two two-megawatt semi-trailer-mounted generators serving Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island — at a cost of approximately $1,660,050 with Cummins Pacific LLC, ratified by the Board of Supervisors on July 25, 2017 — was an SFPUC declaration about SFPUC's own infrastructure. (Source: Board of Supervisors Resolution 0307-17.)

The opinion: an agency that is happy to invoke PG&E as a counterpoint when convenient should be the agency most willing to produce the work orders for the failures on the islands it itself operates. Otherwise the contrast is rhetorical only. The records of those outages exist — in Maximo, in i-INFO logs, in the inboxes of Power Enterprise dispatchers, in the after-action reports following each event. They have not been produced not because the law allows withholding, but because the agency has decided, in writing, that the law's deadlines do not apply.

What's next at the Task Force

The Sunshine Ordinance Task Force is the body charged with adjudicating complaints under San Francisco Administrative Code Chapter 67. The Task Force will receive briefing from both sides and will issue an Order of Determination on the merits. The Complaint Procedures are published at sfgov.org/sunshine. The Task Force meets in public. Anyone can attend, comment, or submit a written statement.

Read the source documents yourself

Verification standard

Every statute quoted in this post was fetched on May 14, 2026 from leginfo.legislature.ca.gov (California Government Code) and sfgov.org (San Francisco Sunshine Ordinance). Every SFPUC quotation is reproduced verbatim from a document SFPUC itself has filed, published, or sent. Every outage event referenced is verifiable against the SFPUC POWER ENTERPRISE ALERT email distribution (alert@sfwater.org) and the public log on this site. The opinion that SFPUC's PG&E framing is a deflection is labeled as opinion and is the editorial position of this site's publisher; it is not asserted as a finding of fact.

What was introduced

On March 24, 2026, San Francisco Board President Rafael Mandelman introduced Ordinance File #260302, which would add a new Section 99.5 to the San Francisco Administrative Code. The ordinance was assigned under the 30 Day Rule to the Land Use and Transportation Committee, with a hearing expected in late April or early May 2026.

Under Section 99.5, the SFPUC may contract to purchase from a customer existing or newly constructed utility facilities that the SFPUC would otherwise be required to install — provided that the SFPUC determines it is feasible to provide power to the project, that the customer agrees the SFPUC will be the power provider, that there is a workforce development agreement (prevailing wage, local hire, first source), and that the SFPUC reasonably determines the cost is equal to or less than what the SFPUC would have paid to do the work itself.

The ordinance authorizes the SFPUC to accept ownership of those facilities and any associated easements.

And then, in its final operative sentence, it does this:

"Contracts PUC enters under this Section 99.5 are exempt from the requirements of Chapters 6 and 21 of the Administrative Code."

Chapter 6 is the city's public works contracting code. Chapter 21 is the city's commodities and services purchasing code. Both require competitive bidding, public advertisement, bid bonds, performance bonds, and Office of Contract Administration oversight. They are the rules that exist to prevent steering, kickbacks, and self-dealing in city contracts.

This ordinance would make those rules not apply to a new category of SFPUC transactions.

Why this matters for Treasure Island

Treasure Island is, on paper, the perfect use case for Section 99.5. The SFPUC already provides electric service to Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island through its Hetch Hetchy Power System. TIDA owns the existing electric infrastructure. The master developer, TICD (Treasure Island Community Development — Lennar / Wilson Meany / Stockbridge), is building out infrastructure for an eventual 8,000 homes, three hotels, retail, and open space. New substations, switchgear, transformers, conduit, and distribution loops are being built right now.

Today, the handoff of that infrastructure between TICD, TIDA, and the SFPUC is messy. New facilities get built by TICD, ownership lives with TIDA, and the SFPUC operates them. When something fails — and on Treasure Island, things fail a lot — there's no clean accountability line.

Section 99.5 would let the SFPUC directly buy the new infrastructure from TICD and own it outright, cutting TIDA out of the ownership chain for new electric assets. On its face, that's a cleaner long-term arrangement and arguably better for residents who have suffered through 537+ documented outages since 1997.

But here is the part that should make every Treasure Island resident pay attention: the SFPUC, on its own internal determination, decides what to pay TICD for the work. There is no competitive bid. There is no Office of Contract Administration review. There is no third-party cost audit. There is no public disclosure of the contractor TICD selected to do the work.

The customer (TICD) picks the contractor. The customer sets the price. The customer submits the bill. The SFPUC pays it. The SFPUC takes ownership. The public never sees the procurement.

The Harlan Kelly problem

On July 14, 2023, a federal jury in the Northern District of California convicted Harlan Kelly Jr., the former General Manager of the SFPUC, on charges including honest services wire fraud, conspiracy, and bank fraud. The evidence at trial showed that for over six years, while Kelly was leading the SFPUC, he received a stream of bribes from a contractor seeking to be awarded millions of dollars in SFPUC contracts. Kelly was sentenced to four years in federal prison and ordered to surrender on June 19, 2024. He is currently incarcerated and appealing his conviction.

The rules Kelly was convicted of circumventing are the rules in Chapters 6 and 21 of the Administrative Code. Competitive bidding. Public advertisement. Office of Contract Administration oversight. Those rules exist precisely so that a single SFPUC official cannot quietly steer millions of dollars in work to a favored party.

After Kelly was arrested, the City Controller, City Attorney, and Ethics Commission produced a joint set of recommendations to strengthen procurement oversight at the SFPUC, reduce General Manager discretion over contractor selection, require independent cost verification, and increase transparency in large contracts.

The ordinance reduces — not increases — procurement oversight. It expands — not reduces — the General Manager's unilateral authority. It substitutes self-certification for independent cost verification. It removes — not adds — the public bidding step.

The structural laundering

Read carefully, Section 99.5 is not just a procurement loophole. It is a structural shift in who picks contractors on city electrical work — and that shift may have the secondary effect of moving the procurement process outside the reach of the federal honest services fraud statute that put Kelly in prison.

Under the old (Kelly-era) model, when corruption happened, it happened directly: a contractor bribed the SFPUC General Manager, who steered the contract to that contractor. That fact pattern is what the federal honest services statute is designed to catch.

Under the Section 99.5 model, the structure is different:

No public official ever picks the contractor. The federal honest services statute generally requires a public-official fiduciary breach. If the contractor selection sits with a private developer who is not a city employee, the federal hook may not reach it.

In other words: the same selection process that produced Kelly's conviction can now happen one layer removed, behind a private developer, and no one has done anything illegal under the new ordinance.

What 99.5 has, and what it does not have

In fairness, the ordinance does include real workforce protections. Any new construction under Section 99.5 must include a workforce development program with nondiscrimination in contracts, prevailing wages, local hire, and first source hiring. Those are not trivial protections, and labor will rightly defend them.

But workforce protections govern who gets hired on the job. They do not govern how the contractor was selected or whether the price is clean. Kelly was not convicted of violating workforce rules. He was convicted of violating bidding rules. Those are the rules Section 99.5 waives.

A good developer-built infrastructure transfer model — and there are good versions of this in other jurisdictions — typically includes:

What this means for Treasure Island specifically

We support cleaner ownership of new electric infrastructure on Treasure Island. We have asked for years for the SFPUC and TIDA to fix the accountability mess. We are not opposed to the structural intent of this ordinance.

But Treasure Island is a community that has been let down by every layer of government with authority over our power system. The State Lands Commission says reliability is not their department. TIDA is $55.9 million in deficit with zero capital improvements over $250,000. The SFPUC operates an aging grid that has failed 537 times since 1997. And the last SFPUC General Manager is in federal prison for steering contracts.

We are exactly the community that cannot afford a procurement model where the developer picks the contractor, the developer sets the price, and the SFPUC pays the bill on its own internal say-so.

If this ordinance passes without amendment, the new electric infrastructure on Treasure Island — the substations, switchgear, transformers, and conduit that TICD is building right now — will be procured under a process with less oversight than the procurement that produced the Kelly indictment.

That is not a reform. That is a regression with a workforce-development bow on it.

What we are asking for

We are not asking the Board of Supervisors to kill this ordinance. We are asking them to amend it so that the post-Kelly reforms are not quietly reversed in a procurement exemption buried in a subsection. Specifically:

What you can do

The Land Use and Transportation Committee will hear this ordinance in late April or early May 2026. Public comment, written and in person, is the most effective intervention point.

Sources

This post is part of an ongoing investigation by the Treasure Island Power Watch into the governance, financing, and oversight of the electrical system that 2,000+ residents of Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island depend on every day.

About the author

Barklee Sanders is Chair of the SFPUC Citizens' Advisory Committee — Power Subcommittee, representing District 6 (which includes Treasure Island). The SFPUC CAC is the advisory body established under the San Francisco Charter to advise the SFPUC Commission, General Manager, and the Board of Supervisors on SFPUC policy and operational matters; the Power Subcommittee has direct subject-matter jurisdiction over the procurement pathway Section 99.5 would authorize. He is also a former Treasure Island resident of roughly five years. The analysis above is offered in both capacities.

The Request

On January 18, 2026, we submitted a formal Public Records Act request to the California State Lands Commission (SLC). The SLC is the state agency charged with overseeing granted public trust lands — and Treasure Island is one of the largest granted trust land parcels in California. Under Public Resources Code Section 6306, TIDA is required to file annual financial reports with SLC, and SLC has oversight authority over how the trust lands are managed.

We asked for four categories of records, all covering 2022 to present:

The goal was simple: find out whether the state — the entity that holds sovereign authority over this land — has ever looked into the fact that 2,000+ residents on public trust land experience chronic power outages, and whether they've ever told TIDA to fix it.

What They Gave Us

SLC's response included two documents totaling about 100 pages. Here's what's in them:

The SLC 150 Standardized Reporting Form for fiscal year ending June 30, 2022 reveals the financial reality of Treasure Island's trust lands:

Let that sink in. The trust lands that 2,000+ people call home are $55.9 million in deficit. TIDA is spending nearly double what it earns. And not a single dollar of capital improvement over $250,000 was made or even planned. This is the financial environment in which the electrical distribution system — the same system that has failed 537 times since 1997 — is expected to be maintained and upgraded.

We asked for reports from 2022 to present. They only provided one year (FY 2021-22). The FY 2022-23, 2023-24, and 2024-25 reports were not included. We've followed up.

In February 2023, we wrote directly to the SLC's Environmental Justice Liaison, Yessica Ramirez, asking for help addressing power outages. We explained that Treasure Island is 60% people of color, with 50% below the federal poverty line, and that outages were ongoing despite years of advocacy.

The response documents show what happened internally at SLC after our email arrived:

Read that again. The SLC's own attorney said utility reliability on trust lands "isn't what we're equipped to assess or fix" — and suggested passing the complaint to TIDA's lawyers. The same TIDA that is $55.9 million in debt with zero capital improvements.

The third set of documents is correspondence between TIDA's outside counsel (Caitlin F. Brown, Shute Mihaly & Weinberger LLP) and SLC staff about modifying utility easements on trust lands. This is where it gets interesting.

The emails describe 11 utility easement changes on Phase 1 trust lands — 5 modifications, 5 new easements, and 1 extinguishment. The reasons listed include:

This correspondence also references the Phase 3 trust exchange closing, where SLC's own Andrew Kershen stated that SLC's goal is to "reduce encumbrances on public trust lands to the maximum feasible extent" and that they would "look with considerable skepticism on easements that effectively preclude public use or access to the trust property."

The documents also include the full recorded Easement Deed (Doc 2018-K602955-00) and survey plats by BKF Engineers — detailed legal descriptions and maps for utility easements A-UE19 through A-UE34 across Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island.

What They Didn't Give Us

The gaps in the response tell their own story:

1. Missing Financial Reports. We asked for 2022-present. They gave us one year. Where are the FY 2022-23, 2023-24, and 2024-25 SLC 150 forms? Either TIDA failed to file them (a violation of Public Resources Code 6306), or SLC failed to produce them (a PRA violation). Either way, it needs an answer.

2. No staff analyses of utility infrastructure. SLC says none exist. They are actively approving where transformers and conduits go on trust lands, but claim they have never analyzed whether the electrical system actually works.

3. No evaluation of whether outages impair trust purposes. SLC explicitly refused, citing Government Code 7920.530(a) — they have no duty to create records that don't exist. In other words: they've never studied the question, and they don't intend to.

4. No follow-up to our 2023 complaint. The internal emails show our outage complaint was passed from Environmental Justice to a staff attorney who said it wasn't their problem. No records of any follow-up, any investigation, any directive to TIDA.

The Contradiction at the Heart of This

Here is what these records reveal when you put them together:

The California State Lands Commission is actively involved in reviewing, approving, and modifying utility easements on Treasure Island trust lands. They negotiate where every transformer, conduit, and utility box goes. They approve the legal descriptions and survey plats. They scrutinize whether easements "preclude public use or access."

But when residents ask whether the electrical system actually works — whether 537 outages since 1997 constitute a failure of the public trust — SLC says that's not their department.

They can't have it both ways. You don't get to control where the transformers go while disclaiming any responsibility for whether they keep the lights on.

What We Did Next

On March 27, 2026, we filed a follow-up PRA request targeting the records that must exist based on what the easement correspondence reveals. When engineers propose new transformers and conduit modifications, there are underlying assessments explaining why the existing infrastructure is inadequate. Those documents will contain references to the condition of the grid.

Our follow-up requests 10 categories of records, including:

Why This Matters

The public trust doctrine exists for the benefit of all Californians. These are state-owned lands, held in trust. When 2,000+ people — in a community that is 60% people of color and 50% below the poverty line — experience chronic power failures on those trust lands, the trustee has an obligation to investigate and act.

The SLC's own records show they haven't. Their internal response to our complaint was to punt it to TIDA. Their financial oversight shows a $55.9 million deficit with zero infrastructure investment. And their refusal to evaluate whether outages impair trust purposes is an abdication of the oversight role the California Legislature assigned them.

We believe these records — and the gaps in them — build a strong foundation for holding the state accountable. Not through confrontation, but through transparency. The Public Records Act exists so that citizens can see what their government is doing. What we've learned is that, when it comes to power reliability on Treasure Island, the state isn't doing much at all.

We'll publish the SLC's response to our follow-up request when it arrives. Every record will be shared here.

Published: March 2026 — obtained via CPRA/Sunshine request (Case 25-8483)

On the night of Saturday, October 25, 2025, every resident on Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island lost grid power. At 9:48 PM, the first i-INFO alert went out: "Power Outage on Treasure Island, Power Outage on Yerba Buena Island." Cause of outage: Maintenance. Estimated number of housing units impacted: 400–500. Prepared by: Ryan Dunbar.

By 11:18 PM, a second alert confirmed what residents already knew from the hum of diesel engines: "2MW generators activated, Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island on generator power." The entire residential population of both islands — including families at Maceo May, The Bristol, and Isle House Apartments — was running on backup generators. "Generation will power island till 5am," the alert stated. "No further updates planned."

I filed a CPRA/Sunshine request (Case 25-8483) to get the internal records behind this event. What came back — a work order from SFPUC's Tivoli/IBM system and the original i-INFO alert emails — tells a story of an island-wide power disruption that was classified as routine maintenance, staffed with overtime crews, and communicated to residents with the bare minimum of information.

The Work Order: WO 9105747

Work Order 9105747 is titled: "TI/YBI Planned Outage 10/25/25 for PG&E maintenance at Port of Oakland."

The cause: PG&E was conducting maintenance on their system at the Port of Oakland — specifically, an overnight shutdown of the 115 kV transmission line that delivers electricity to both Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island. This is the trans-bay feed. When it goes down, the islands have no grid power. The only option is generators.

The outage was scheduled in two windows: Saturday, October 25 from 10:00 PM to 11:30 PM, and Sunday, October 26 from 5:00 AM to 6:00 AM. PG&E had already adjusted the schedule at least once — the work order notes that "the times displayed above have been adjusted from our previous alerts."

The job plan had two tasks: Task 10 ("Switching to Generator power") and Task 20 ("Switching back"). Both completed — status: FIELDCOMP. The work order was reported by Victor Hong (VHONG) on October 23 and supervised by Ryan Dunbar (RDUNBAR), Crew PE2.

The Costs: $6,857 Planned, $3,963 Actual

Planned labor: $6,857.05 — budgeted for 9 workers across 32+ hours at rates from $78.38 to $102.89/hr.

Actual labor: $3,963.00 — five crew members logged time across October 24–27:

All field hours on October 25–27 were logged as premium time at 1.5x rate — confirming this was weekend/overtime work. The log entry from November 7 reads: "10/26/25 - Support completed for PG&E overnight shutdown to the 115 kV line to the Port."

What the Alerts Told Residents

Two i-INFO alerts were sent to the PWR TI Alert distribution list — a massive list that includes SFPUC Management, CDD, WSTD, WQD, SFPUC Communications, SFPUC Health and Safety, SFPUC Infrastructure, SFPW, SFDPH, 311, TIDA, DEM, and other stakeholders.

That second alert is worth re-reading. "No further updates planned." Every household on both islands is running on diesel backup generators at 11 PM on a Saturday night, and SFPUC's position is: we're done communicating.

The Classification Question: "Maintenance"

Both alerts classify the cause of outage as "Maintenance." The work order confirms this was a planned event — PG&E requested the shutdown for their own system maintenance at the Port of Oakland.

But here's the question residents should be asking: Is it "maintenance" when 400–500 households lose grid power for 8 hours and are placed on backup diesel generators?

From SFPUC's perspective, this was planned and coordinated. From a resident's perspective — especially one who didn't receive advance notice, or whose medical equipment doesn't care whether the outage was "planned" — this was a power outage affecting the entire island. The distinction between "planned" and "unplanned" matters for SFPUC's internal reporting. It matters a lot less when your refrigerator is running on a generator at midnight.

The Trans-Bay Vulnerability

This outage exposes a fundamental vulnerability in Treasure Island's power infrastructure: the islands depend on a single transmission feed from the mainland. When PG&E shuts down the 115 kV line at the Port of Oakland — for any reason — both islands go dark. The only backup is generator power.

This is the same trans-bay cable dependency that caused the catastrophic November 2019 outage (Incident #4 in our records), when the Davis Substation feed failed and generators themselves broke down, forcing intentional blackouts across the island for two days.

Six years later, the fundamental architecture hasn't changed. One cable. One point of failure. Diesel generators as the only backup for 2,000+ residents.

What the Records Show

Work Order 9105747 is not a story of emergency failure. It's a story of routine dependency — an island of 2,000+ people placed on diesel backup power because a single mainland transmission line needed maintenance. The crews did their jobs. The generators worked. The lights stayed on (via diesel).

But the records also show what this costs: $3,963 in overtime labor for five crew members working a Saturday night into Sunday morning — just to babysit a generator switchover that wouldn't be necessary if the islands had redundant power feeds or sufficient on-island generation.

And they show how SFPUC communicates during these events: two alerts, one "estimated restoration" time, and a "no further updates planned" sign-off while every household runs on backup power through the night.

For an island that has already endured 500+ outages in 28 years, "no further updates planned" isn't a communication strategy. It's a philosophy.

Source Documents

Records obtained via CPRA/Sunshine request Case 25-8483:

Published: August 2025 — obtained via public records request (PRR 25-6234 and 25-6232)

On the night of August 16, 2025, residents at Gateview Avenue and Avenue B heard a loud noise at 11:36 PM. A fuse had blown on Pole H017. What followed was a 38-hour ordeal that should embarrass every official at SFPUC and the Treasure Island Development Authority — and it would have, if they thought anyone was watching.

I filed public records requests to get the internal documents. Work orders. Crew logs. Email chains between SFPUC, TIDA, DEM, and DPH. Every alert sent to residents. What's in those files paints a picture of systemic dysfunction that no press release can cover up.

The Numbers First

They Already Knew the Cable Was a Problem

Here is the most damning sentence in the entire document set. It comes from an internal SFPUC coordination email sent by Emergency Planning & Security coordinator Stephanie Murti on the night of August 17, at 7:49 PM — while residents were still in the dark:

Read that again. Similar problem in December. The December 2024 underground cable failure at Gateview Ave — the one that lasted 24 hours and left 42 units dark while crews "exhausted their supply" — was not an isolated incident. SFPUC's own emergency coordinator confirmed it: they already knew this section of cable was failing. And they did nothing preventive.

TIDA owns the infrastructure. SFPUC operates it. Together they presided over a known-bad cable for nine months and let it take out residents' power again in August.

The Equipment That Broke Mid-Repair

Here is where institutional incompetence reaches an almost satirical level.

At 5:30 AM on August 17, SFPUC crews were using a Megger — a cable-testing device — to isolate the fault. The Megger's screen froze. The equipment broke in the middle of a live outage.

The crew knew they needed a firmware update to fix it. What happened next is documented in the crew log:

City. Computers. Denied. The. Download.

While 30 to 100 residents sat without power on a 90-degree August afternoon, SFPUC crews were on hold with tech support because the City of San Francisco's IT infrastructure blocked them from downloading a firmware patch for their own repair equipment. They did not return to Treasure Island until 5:00 PM. The actual fault — the transformer — was not even identified until 7:35 PM.

This is not an edge case. This is what it looks like when you treat a low-income island community as a low priority.

Workers Timed Out. Residents Stayed Dark.

By 7:35 PM on August 17 — 20 hours into the outage — crews finally identified the bad transformer: TX-155 at Building 1307. By 9:25 PM, power had been restored to all units except Building 1307.

But the crew was approaching its working time limit.

The August 17 coordination call summary from Stephanie Murti reads:

So SFPUC's solution — when a 37.5 KVA transformer fails and leaves a building full of residents without power — is to hook up a diesel generator, leave, sleep, and come back in the morning. Building 1307 ran on generator power through the night and into the next day. The transformer was not replaced until August 18, with full power restored at 1:40 PM.

Thirty-eight hours.

TIDA's Role: Counting Units and Sending Emails

I read every email in these records looking for TIDA doing something — anything — operational. Here is the full documented contribution of the Treasure Island Development Authority during this 38-hour outage:

That's it. TIDA owns this infrastructure. The agency exists specifically to oversee Treasure Island's development and resident welfare. And their documented response to a 38-hour outage affecting dozens of units was: knock on some doors and send an email.

No emergency housing. No formal check on medical device-dependent residents. No public statement. No accountability.

The Alerts Told Residents Nothing

SFPUC sent eight i-INFO alerts across the two-day incident. Here is what every single one said under "Estimated Restoration":

For more than 20 consecutive hours, the agency responsible for power on Treasure Island could not — or would not — give residents a timeline. "Cause of Outage" cycled between "Unknown" and "Equipment Failure" while crews were still figuring out what was wrong.

One of the alerts sent by the Department of Emergency Management helpfully directed residents to check the PG&E outage map for updates. SFPUC is not PG&E. PG&E does not serve Treasure Island. The DEM sent residents to the wrong utility's website during an active power emergency.

This Is Not Acceptable

SFPUC runs this grid. They have run it for 25 years. This is not their first transformer failure on Gateview Avenue. This is not the first time crews have "timed out" and left residents on generator power overnight. The December 2024 outage lasted 24 hours for the same reason on the same circuit. The August 2025 outage lasted 38 hours.

The pattern is not bad luck. It is institutional neglect — compounded by aging infrastructure, broken testing equipment, city IT systems that block emergency firmware downloads, and an agency that has never faced real consequences for any of it.

TIDA's job is to protect the people who live on Treasure Island. When their own documents show nothing more than a headcount and a door knock during a 38-hour outage, they are not doing their job.

I am publishing these records in full so residents, elected officials, and journalists can see what SFPUC and TIDA's own internal documents say. No spin. No press release. Just what they wrote to each other while the lights were out.

Source Documents

Records obtained via PRR 25-6234 and 25-6232:

Published: March 2026 — obtained via public records request (Case 25-7677)

On the morning of October 2, 2025, SFPUC sent its first i-INFO alert at 9:01 AM: a planned outage was underway at 1301 through 1310 Gateview Avenue and 901/905 Avenue B. The HV team was doing maintenance. Estimated restoration: 3:00 PM. Between 50 and 100 housing units would lose power.

By 3:19 PM, the outage had expanded beyond the original scope to cover all of Gateview Avenue. A second alert announced an additional 15–20 minute outage to “hook back to grid power.” At 3:34 PM, a third and final alert confirmed: grid power restored. No further updates planned.

Three alerts. Six and a half hours of downtime. A routine planned maintenance event. But the work order behind it — WO 9091320 — tells a much deeper story about the state of Treasure Island’s underground electrical infrastructure and the ongoing cost of keeping an 80-year-old grid alive.

The Work Order: What They Were Actually Doing

Work Order 9091320 is titled: “TI: Maintenace - Planned outage. Gateview Ave & Ave B for underground work.” (Yes, “Maintenace” — misspelled in SFPUC’s own system.)

The work order was reported by Victor Hong (VHONG) on October 1, 2025, with a phone contact of 415-227-8503. It was assigned Priority 1 — the highest urgency level — under the PE (Power Enterprise) site, supervised by Ryan Dunbar (RDUNBAR) with Crew PE2.

Scheduled to begin October 2 and finish October 9, the actual work started a day early on October 1 with prep by crew member TELISAIA, who logged 4 hours of regular time. The work then continued intermittently through October 26 — more than three weeks beyond the original scheduled finish.

The Crew: Seven Workers, Premium Hours, $9,722 in Labor

Seven SFPUC crew members logged time on this work order:

Note the premium hours. On October 2 alone — the day of the planned outage — four crew members logged premium (overtime) hours: BITKIS (2 hrs), JECOLLINS (2.5 hrs), RDUNBAR (3 hrs), and TELISAIA (2.5 hrs). On October 9, five crew members returned for another full day, with three logging premium hours again. Premium rates were 1.5x regular pay.

The work extended into late October: BITKIS logged 4 hours of premium time on October 25 and 6 hours of premium on October 26. JECOLLINS appeared on October 24 but logged zero hours — possibly a scheduling/cancellation.

The Materials: $11,154 in Underground Cable Components

The materials list reads like a catalog of underground high-voltage cable infrastructure replacement. Nineteen line items, all sourced from the TI-PE (Treasure Island Power Enterprise) storeroom:

The Pattern: Same Location, Same Problem, Same Cables

If the location sounds familiar, it should. Gateview Avenue is ground zero for Treasure Island’s underground cable failures. This is the same corridor where:

Work Order 9091320 is linked to a related work order: WO 8356467, “TI: Maintenance - VIP Powerline perform routine maintenance.” This suggests the October work was part of a broader effort to address the underground cable infrastructure that had failed twice in the previous ten months.

The materials tell the story: nine junction brackets, 48 bushing inserts, 12 load-break elbows, 66 tap connectors. This wasn’t a patch job. This was wholesale replacement of underground cable connection hardware across the Gateview corridor.

What $20,876 Buys You on Treasure Island

Total project cost: $20,876 ($9,722 labor + $11,154 materials)

For context, this single planned maintenance work order cost roughly the same as a year’s rent for a Treasure Island household. It replaced components in an underground cable system built in the 1940s for the U.S. Navy — infrastructure that SFPUC and TIDA have known for decades is past its useful life.

The October 2025 work was necessary. The underground cable system at Gateview had proven catastrophically unreliable, with two major unplanned failures in the preceding ten months. But the question residents should be asking is: why did it take two emergency outages — one lasting 24 hours, the other 38 hours — before SFPUC scheduled a Priority 1 underground overhaul?

The December 2024 cable failure and August 2025 transformer failure were both traced to the same underground infrastructure. SFPUC’s own records confirmed in August that the cable was a “known repeat-failure” section. Yet the planned maintenance work order wasn’t created until October 1, 2025 — more than nine months after the first failure.

The Three Alerts: A Timeline

What the Records Show

This work order is one of the rare cases where a planned outage produced a positive outcome. The underground cable infrastructure at Gateview — the same section responsible for two emergency outages totaling 62 hours of unplanned downtime — received a comprehensive overhaul. New junction brackets, bushing inserts, load-break elbows, and ground rods were installed across the corridor.

But it also raises uncomfortable questions about SFPUC’s maintenance philosophy on Treasure Island. Why does it take catastrophic failure — residents sitting in the dark for 24 and 38 hours — before infrastructure gets replaced? Why was a “known repeat-failure” cable section allowed to fail twice before a Priority 1 work order was created? And how many other underground cable sections across the island are one failure away from the same crisis?

For an island with 80-year-old infrastructure serving 500 homes, $20,876 is not a lot of money. The real cost is measured in the 62 hours of emergency outages that preceded this repair — hours residents spent without power, without refrigeration, without medical devices, because a known-bad cable was left in the ground until it failed again.

Source Documents

Records obtained via Case 25-7677:

Published: January 22, 2026 — by DOGE (Digital Operations for Government Enforcement)

San Francisco officials opened 2026 with a polished message about PG&E’s Dec 20, 2025 citywide outage. They blasted emails, asked residents to “share your outage stories,” and renewed the call for full public power.

Here’s the part they don’t say: Treasure Island has been “public power” for 25 years. SFPUC runs the grid there. TIDA runs the ground. And during those 25 years, residents endured outages every two to three weeks.

This post lays out (1) what the City is doing now, (2) why that framing rings hollow for Treasure Island, and (3) the full text of an open letter that puts the receipts on the record.

What the City Is Doing (Right Now)

Below is the core message City Hall circulated to San Franciscans as 2026 began — calling out PG&E and soliciting outage stories from the public:

As we begin 2026, one thing is already clear. PG&E is starting the year the same way it ended the last: unreliable, unaccountable, and not working for San Francisco.

Amid the busyness of the holidays, the massive PG&E power outage on December 20, 2025, plunged one-third of our city into darkness. For many of us, service disruptions and uncertainty continued into the new year.

You deserve better. And we want to hear from you. Please share any photos or videos you might have captured during the recent power outage via email using the link below.* Your stories help amplify a simple truth: PG&E continues to let San Francisco down.

Jen Kwart, a spokesperson for the San Francisco City Attorney’s Office, said in a statement that the city had made “earnest attempts to make progress with PG&E” on the city’s effort to buy the utility’s power lines. But Kwart said PG&E had “used delay tactics to drag out proceedings, and has been slow in providing information needed by San Francisco.”

San Franciscans deserve a power system that is reliable, affordable, and invested in our communities, not corporate profits.

And this isn’t theoretical. San Francisco already does public power—and does it well. For more than 100 years, the City has delivered clean, reliable, affordable electricity through its two clean power programs: Hetch Hetchy Power and CleanPowerSF. Together, these public power programs already meet 75% of San Francisco’s electricity needs.

In 2023 alone, SFPUC customers saved more than $170 million on electric bills compared to what they would have paid PG&E.

Thank you for your continued support!

Note: By sharing photos or videos, you grant consent to the SFPUC to use them for social media and promotion purposes.

Why That Message Rings Hollow on Treasure Island

Because public power on Treasure Island is already your responsibility, City Hall. SFPUC is the provider on TI/YBI. TIDA controls the ground. Together you’ve presided over a system that residents say has failed every few weeks for a generation — long before a single 2025 citywide outage.

If one PG&E outage is enough to justify a mass survey and a press push, then twenty-five years of outages on Treasure Island should have ended the problem, not produced another survey. Stop the performative asks. Publish the Failure Mode Analysis, publish the Corrective Action Plan, and hit your targets.

For receipts and a living archive of outages, see:

Open Letter (Full Text)

Short version: Treasure Island has been “public power” for 25 years. SFPUC runs the grid. TIDA runs the ground. And for 25 years, residents have lived with outages every few weeks. Now SFPUC blasts citywide emails asking for “your outage stories” about PG&E. Save it. Treasure Island has been handing you our stories for a quarter century—and you ignored them.

The Navy left. The City took over. TIDA got the land. SFPUC’s Hetch Hetchy Power became the utility on Treasure Island—not PG&E. You inherited brittle, end-of-life infrastructure and chose patches over replacement. The result: chronic blackouts became normal.

SFPUC Hetch Hetchy (TI’s provider):

SFPUC TI project page (admits “past useful life”):

Redevelopment deals advanced; the electricity didn’t. Residents and businesses built their lives around candles and surge protectors. You called it progress. We called it Tuesday.

Community outage ledger:

Press releases, ribbon-cutting energy. And then? More outages. “Bird strike.” “Equipment failure.” “Cause unknown.” The system is fragile because you kept it fragile.

“Near-term measures” press:

Outage after outage. Voltage sags, fried appliances, lost income. Residents show up and repeat the same testimony, because you repeat the same failures.

TIDA packets & minutes (examples):

At least 487 outages since 1997. Roughly 18 a year. Four times PG&E’s rate citywide. They ordered a Failure Mode Analysis and a Corrective Action Plan to bring TI up to basic San Francisco standards. Where is it? Where’s the schedule, the budget, the responsible engineer, the promised outage-reduction curve?

CAC resolution (the receipts):

One big PG&E outage hits the news, and suddenly SFPUC has time to email everyone for “stories.” Cute. On Treasure Island, public power is you—and our stories fill an entire website, board packets, and your own resolutions.

SFPUC outage info/hotline:

TIDA video archive (on-record admissions):

If one citywide outage justifies a mass survey and a media tour, what do outages every 2–3 weeks for 25 years tell you? They tell you this: you didn’t care enough to fix it. You cared enough to draft press releases. You cared enough to collect other people’s stories. You never cared enough to end ours.

What Happens Now (No Wiggle Room)

1. Publish the Failure Mode Analysis and Corrective Action Plan—not a summary, the whole thing—on both SFPUC and TIDA websites, with line-items mapping each recurring cause (animal contact, underground fault, “unknown”) to a specific fix (covered conductor, sectionalizing/reclosers, targeted undergrounding, SCADA/telemetry upgrades), plus dates, costs, and responsible staff.

Post to SFPUC “Power Outages” page:

Add as standing “Communications” item in TIDA packets: e.g.,

2. Monthly public dashboard showing outages vs. target, fixes installed vs. plan, dollars budgeted/encumbered/spent, and a forecast to parity with citywide reliability. If the parity date slips, the General Manager and TIDA Director explain it on camera at the next meeting.

3. Immediate harm-reduction until parity is reached: surge protection grants, UPS stipends for medical devices, backup for life-safety systems in multi-unit buildings—funded by SFPUC’s own “community investment” rhetoric you use everywhere else.

4. Standardized claims + restitution for equipment damage and business losses tied to voltage sags and unplanned outages, with outcomes reported quarterly.

5. Capital audit: Controller and Board of Supervisors reconcile Treasure Island line items in the City’s infrastructure plan against what got built and what reliability lift resulted. No more “we spent, therefore we solved.”

Infrastructure plan:

Say it Plain

Stop the performative virtue signaling. Stop the surveys. Stop asking San Franciscans to send you glossy “outage stories” while your public-power neighborhood—our neighborhood—has been blacking out on a two-to-three-week rhythm for a generation. If one December 20, 2025 outage is enough for you to blast the city with a questionnaire, then twenty-five years of outages on Treasure Island should have ended this problem a long time ago.

You are not better than PG&E if Treasure Island still lives like this. You don’t get to sell public-power victories downtown and pretend Treasure Island doesn’t exist. You’ve had 25 years of our stories. You don’t get another survey until you deliver results.

Receipts & Links

Another Day, Another Outage: When City-Controlled Infrastructure Gets No Love

On December 22, 2025, at 10:42 AM, Treasure Island residents received yet another power outage alert from SFPUC. Buildings 201, 202, and parts of Avenue H and I lost power—cause unknown, restoration time unavailable. This marks the 28th outage of 2025, bringing the total since 1997 to 529 power failures.

The Double Standard

Here's what's galling: when citywide PG&E outages hit San Francisco's mainland neighborhoods, the response is swift and visible. Mayor Breed holds press conferences. SFPUC issues detailed updates. Emergency Operations Centers activate. Resources mobilize.

But when SFPUC's own grid—the one they fully control and operate on Treasure Island—fails for the 28th time this year? Silence. A terse email. No estimated restoration time. No accountability. No urgency.

The Numbers Don't Lie

Let's be crystal clear about the disparity:

San Francisco loves to virtue signal about public power, climate justice, and equitable infrastructure. The PublicPowerSF campaign promises local control will mean better service, more accountability, and community-focused utilities.

But Treasure Island is the pilot program—and it's a catastrophic failure.

What This Latest Outage Reveals

The December 22nd alert contained these telling details:

This isn't emergency response—it's negligence with a subject line.

The Broader Context Matters

When PG&E's grid fails, San Francisco mobilizes:

When SFPUC's grid fails on Treasure Island:

The Hypocrisy

The city that demands accountability from PG&E refuses to hold itself to the same standard. The agency that criticizes investor-owned utilities for unreliable service operates a municipal grid with a failure rate four times higher than the mainland average.

PublicPowerSF campaigns on promises of local control and better service. But local control already exists on Treasure Island—and it's been failing for 28 years.

What Needs to Change

If San Francisco truly believes public power is superior to private utilities, SFPUC must:

1. Apply the same emergency response standards to Treasure Island that apply to mainland outages

2. Provide real-time restoration estimates, not "N/A" dismissals

3. Count the impacted households—these are people, not statistics to ignore

4. Investigate root causes before crews arrive, not after residents sit in darkness for hours

5. Face the same public scrutiny and accountability the city demands from PG&E

Bottom Line

Outage #529 happened today because the city that runs this grid doesn't care enough to fix it. They care about the optics of public power. They care about criticizing PG&E. They care about virtue signaling on climate.

But they don't care about 2,000 Treasure Island residents living with a grid that fails 18 times per year—four times the rate of the private utility they love to condemn.

Until SFPUC faces real consequences for this institutional failure, the outages will continue. The emails will keep coming. And San Francisco's credibility on public power will remain as unreliable as the Treasure Island grid.

The Power Failure Chronicles: When Will San Francisco Finally Keep the Lights On?

San Francisco has endured more than 529 documented power disruptions in just 25 years—a staggering statistic that undercuts every promise of resilience and equity our city proclaims. And the hits keep coming: June 2025 alone saw at least four separate outage alerts blasted to residents, punctuated by diesel-generator fumes and scrambled schedules.

June’s Outage Scorecard

June 9 – “Planned YBI Outage.” A morning maintenance cut for Coast Guard work on Yerba Buena Island left up to 50 homes guessing when their refrigerators would hum again.

June 21 – Island-wide Failure. By breakfast, SFPUC had already fired up 2 MW of emergency generators; by mid-afternoon it was issuing full “Power Outage on Treasure Island” warnings. Same day, two separate emails—same misery.

June 22 – Another “Planned Outage.” Less than 36 hours later, residents got a fresh notice of yet more scheduled downtime.

June 24 – Déjà Vu Blackout. A new alert for Treasure Island proved the fixes hadn’t held.

That’s six official emails covering four blackout events in a single month—an average of one crisis notice every five days.

Why This Is Unacceptable

Every flicker costs something: insulin warms in powerless fridges, Wi-Fi drops during tele-health calls, and diesel fumes choke an island that’s supposed to model sustainable redevelopment. When outages climb past 500, the issue isn’t bad luck—it’s broken governance.

SFPUC runs the municipal grid feeding the islands. TIDA approves every new unit and business that plugs into that grid. When these agencies fail in tandem, entire neighborhoods lose their safety net.

A Direct Appeal to Mayor Daniel Lurie and “New San Francisco”

Voters just handed the keys to a new City Hall team—Mayor Daniel Lurie pledged a no-nonsense rebuild of essential services (washingtonpost.com). Here’s how to start delivering on that pledge:

1. Embrace radical transparency. Publish a live outage dashboard with cause, fix status, and accountability owner for each incident.

2. Harden the infrastructure now. Underground critical feeders, install sectionalizing switches, and stand up solar-battery storage microgrids on both islands.

3. Unify the message. One portal, one timeline—no more dueling notices from SFPUC and TIDA.

4. Make residents whole. We demand an emergency declaration NOW, a detailed grid upgrade report!

Bottom Line

Innovation is San Francisco’s brand—but a city that powers AI startups shouldn’t leave seniors hunting for flashlight batteries. New San Francisco has the leadership, the mandate, and the moral obligation to end this blackout cycle—starting today. Until then, every fresh “planned outage” email is another reminder that the clock is ticking, louder than any diesel generator ever could.

If SFPUC Can’t Power 125 Buildings, SFPUC Can’t Power a City. Why SFPUC’s Public Power Ambitions Collapse Under the Weight of Treasure Island’s Reality.

For anyone watching the PublicPowerSF campaign with cautious optimism, I’d ask you to take a closer look at the only place in San Francisco where the City already has full control over the electrical grid: Treasure Island.

This isn't a theoretical argument or a philosophical debate about clean energy or local control. This is a case study with decades of real-world data, broken promises, and lived consequences. It’s a pilot program that should have been a proof of concept—and instead, it’s a glaring warning sign.

What’s Happening on Treasure Island?

Treasure Island's legacy housing community is small, tightly defined, and long-neglected. It consists of approximately 500 housing units, spread across about 125 buildings, home to around 2500 residents. These buildings, many of them relics from previous military use, house families who’ve weathered decades of environmental uncertainty, redevelopment displacement, and deteriorating infrastructure.

When it comes to electricity, there’s no ambiguity about who’s responsible: SFPUC (San Francisco Public Utilities Commission) has full control over the island’s electrical infrastructure. PG&E isn’t involved here. This is 100% the City’s domain.

And yet—power is unreliable. Outages are frequent. Voltage is unstable. Temporary fixes are more common than long-term upgrades. Residents routinely lose appliances to power surges. And after all this time, there’s still no sense of urgency or transparency from the agency tasked with keeping the lights on.

Now Compare That to the Rest of San Francisco

San Francisco, as a whole, contains over 410,000 residential units, more than 120,000 buildings, and a population of roughly 875,000 people. The electrical grid is currently run by PG&E. The Treasure Island legacy grid supports less than 0.1% of San Francisco’s population. It’s an island—geographically contained, with no industrial load. And yet, SFPUC has never been able to consistently make it work.

So the question becomes inescapable: If an agency can’t manage electricity for 500 homes, how can they credibly ask to manage electricity for over 400,000?

The Numbers Tell a Story

Treasure Island is the proof. And the proof is failing. Under California Government Code §4217.12, any public utility looking to expand its reach must first demonstrate its technical and financial feasibility.

Public Power Without Public Accountability Isn’t Progress

Let’s be clear: I support the principles behind public power. Local control. Climate action. Equitable service. But principles mean nothing if they’re not rooted in actual performance—and SFPUC has not earned the trust required for this scale of responsibility.

What Needs to Happen Before Any Expansion

1. Independent Audit: An objective, third-party review of SFPUC’s performance on Treasure Island must be conducted and made public.

2. Mandatory Infrastructure Upgrades: The legacy grid on Treasure Island must be modernized and stabilized before any expansion plan proceeds.

3. Transparent Public Disclosure: All PublicPowerSF campaign materials should acknowledge and address current service failures.

4. Resident Oversight: Communities already affected by mismanagement must have a seat at the table.

Final Word: This Is the Sandbox, and It’s on Fire

Treasure Island was the sandbox. It was the small, controlled environment where SFPUC had every opportunity to prove they could manage a local grid. Instead, they’ve spilled the juice, scorched the sand, and left the kids in the dark. That’s not a foundation for citywide leadership. That’s a red flag waving in broad daylight.

They Say I'm Asking Too Many Questions. I Say They’ve Been Ignoring Too Many Outages. A “General Rule of Reason,” They Call It.

You’ve got to admire the language, if not the logic. That’s the phrase SFPUC used to justify throttling my access to public records: “We are invoking a general rule of reason...”

Sounds noble, doesn’t it? Almost philosophical. A little Roman, even—like they’re laying down some timeless code of civic balance.

But let’s decode it.

What they’re actually saying is: We’ve decided your need for answers is no longer reasonable. We’ve decided our discomfort with your questions outweighs your right to ask them. We’ve decided to govern public transparency based on our patience—not your rights.

That’s not a rule of reason. That’s a rule of convenience.

And here’s the kicker—the irony so sharp it could cut the power. They invoke “reason” to justify blocking access to information about a power system that’s been failing—unreasonably—for over 25 years.

Let me spell that out: There have been over 290 documented power outages on Treasure Island since 2017. Fifty-eight outages have happened just since Barklee Sanders joined the SFPUC CAC. Some people have lost power a dozen times a year. Seniors have been left without elevators. Families have spent nights without heat, light, or refrigeration.

And for decades, city agencies—SFPUC included—have shrugged and said: “We’re working on it.”

So let me ask:

Was it reasonable to keep redeveloping Treasure Island while the grid collapsed underneath it?

Was it reasonable to leave families in public housing vulnerable to constant blackouts?

Was it reasonable to approve budgets, issue bonds, and launch projects, all while the basics—keeping the lights on—went unresolved?

But now that I’m requesting documentation? Now that Barklee Sanders is holding a flashlight to the file cabinet? Now I’m the unreasonable one?

Let’s be clear: What’s unreasonable is trying to spin transparency as a threat. What’s unreasonable is weaponizing bureaucratic language to avoid accountability.

Barklee Sanders is not moved by the poetry of your “general rule of reason.” Because nothing about this situation has been reasonable. Not for years.

If they really believed in reason, they’d be sitting in living rooms during outages. They’d be reviewing emergency response failures, not redacting them. They’d be standing on Treasure Island, not hiding behind desktop policies.

So yes, Barklee Sanders will keep filing records requests. Because “reason” should belong to the public, not to the institutions failing us. And until SFPUC proves otherwise, Barklee Sanders will keep shining the light.

Because Sunshine is coming. Even if the electricity still isn’t.

Lights Out on Treasure Island: Can Utility Accountability Ideas Finally Bring Solutions?

For residents of Treasure Island, the promise of a revitalized community is often overshadowed by persistent, frustrating problems. High among them are the recurring power outages, meticulously documented by residents on sites like treasureislandsfpoweroutages.com. This isn't just an inconvenience; it's a sign that the systems meant to support the community are falling short, leaving residents feeling failed by both the Treasure Island Development Authority (TIDA) and, seemingly, the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) which manages grid operations.

The question is: How do we fix this accountability gap? While TIDA oversees development and SFPUC handles utility operations, the result for residents is unreliable power. Perhaps we can find inspiration for stronger oversight in SB 332, the Investor-Owned Utilities Accountability Act.

Let's be clear: SB 332 targets massive private utilities. TIDA is a public development agency, and SFPUC is a city department. You can't just copy the law. But the principles of accountability within SB 332 offer a powerful model we could adapt specifically for TIDA's oversight role on Treasure Island.

1. Mandated Independent Audits – Focusing on the Real Problems

SB 332 Idea: Audits of utility equipment.

TIDA Application: Legislation could require TIDA to fund independent, third-party audits specifically targeting critical island infrastructure, especially the electrical distribution system. These audits wouldn't just look at new development but assess the reliability, maintenance, and resilience of the power grid serving residents right now.

2. Performance Standards – Setting Clear Expectations for Power Reliability

SB 332 Idea: Standards for utility safety and reliability.

TIDA Application: Legislation could establish binding, measurable performance standards for TIDA related to essential services. Crucially, this would include metrics for power grid uptime and outage restoration times. TIDA would be mandated to publicly report performance against these standards.

3. Accountability for Fixing Deficiencies – No More Excuses

SB 332 Idea: Addressing equipment past its "useful life."

TIDA Application: When independent audits identify deficiencies – like specific weaknesses in the power grid causing outages – legislation could require TIDA to develop, fund, and publicly report on corrective action plans with clear timelines.

4. Enhanced Transparency – Giving Residents Real Power

SB 332 Idea: Curbing abuses partly through transparency.

TIDA Application: Legislation could mandate radical transparency from TIDA regarding infrastructure status, maintenance schedules (especially for the electrical grid), and audit results. This includes proactive communication before predictable issues arise and clear channels for residents to report problems and receive substantive responses.

Solving the Problem

Applying these adapted principles directly to TIDA creates a lever for change. It forces an independent, objective look at the root causes of the power outages. It sets non-negotiable standards for reliable electricity that TIDA must ensure are met. It empowers residents with information and clear pathways for recourse.

Look, let’s be clear: A government's fundamental promise is to provide basic, essential services reliably to all its people. When that promise is broken, especially for the most vulnerable, while gleaming monuments to bureaucracy sit underutilized, it’s more than a failure of policy – it’s a profound failure of priorities.

Link To Record Request Data: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1K4zdw0JOncLOlsMQuw-HP9TIqG1SCmTC?usp=sharing

We see this starkly in San Francisco. On one hand, the SFPUC operates from its $200 million headquarters at 525 Golden Gate Avenue – a building designed for over 900 employees, showcasing sustainable ambitions. Yet, based on recent data and city-wide trends, this state-of-the-art facility often appears significantly underused. This raises serious questions about the efficient use of such a massive public investment.

On the other hand, turn your eyes to Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island. As the Citizens' Advisory Committee Resolution damningly outlines, residents there endure an average of 18 power outages per year, a rate four times higher than mainland San Francisco. These aren't fleeting flickers; they are disruptions averaging 4-5 hours each, accumulating to over 500 outages since 1997. This isn't just an inconvenience; it's a crisis disproportionately afflicting a community where 60% are low-income households.

The provided Resolution lays bare the appalling reality:

Chronic Failure: Decades of unreliable power delivery, far exceeding acceptable levels.

Disparate Treatment: While new developments on the island receive infrastructure upgrades, existing residents, many low-income, are told their dangerously unreliable, aging system will remain for potentially another 10 to 15 years.

Alleged Inaction and Lack of Oversight: The resolution explicitly calls out TIDA for failing to take sufficient action and demands accountability for the $15 million previously allocated for ensuring reliable power.

Ignoring Emergency Powers: The City possesses the authority to declare emergencies and take immediate action, as Mayor Breed herself stated was a priority during mainland outages, yet this same urgency seems absent for Treasure Island residents.

This is where the critique becomes harsh, and necessarily so. How can the City justify the operational costs and resource allocation supporting a significantly underoccupied, multi-million dollar headquarters downtown while simultaneously overseeing an agency that allows a critical lifeline like electricity to repeatedly fail for a vulnerable island community?

The glaring contrast between the half-empty glass tower on Golden Gate Avenue and the persistent darkness endured by families on Treasure Island speaks volumes about misplaced priorities.

Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island are special spots—small communities with big views and even bigger potential. But the utility systems keeping our lights on and water running are old, and fixing them isn’t cheap. A 2004 report pegged repairs at $11.5 million and yearly maintenance at $720,000. Adjusted for inflation to 2025, that’s $19.3 million upfront and $1.2 million a year. For our roughly 2,000 residents, that’s $9,650 per person for repairs and $600 annually.

The Costs Hit Home

That 2004 "Utility Vulnerability and Risk Assessment" laid out what it’d take to keep our grid—water, sewer, power—going during a 10-to-15-year transition. Today, $19.3 million for repairs and $1.2 million yearly is what it’d cost in 2025 dollars. It’s not pocket change, but it’s what keeps our islands livable while redevelopment plans for 8,000 new homes roll out.

We’ve Stepped Up Before

Here’s the kicker: we’ve already shown we can pull together for something big. As a Bay Area community, we raised $11 million to turn the Bay Bridge lights back on—a dazzling win that proves we care about our home. If we can drop $11 million to light up a bridge, shouldn’t the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) match that grit to fix our grid? We’ve done our part; now it’s their turn to keep our essentials running.

Why It’s Urgent

Those 2004 fixes were for a transition that’s mostly over (2004-2019), but our systems are still aging. Power outages, water issues—they’re not just annoyances; they’re risks. With redevelopment in full swing, the current 2,000 of us shouldn’t be stuck with a crumbling grid while new folks move in. That $19.3 million upgrade isn’t a luxury—it’s a must to keep island life solid.

Time to Act

We rallied $11 million for the Bay Bridge lights because it mattered. Now, the SFPUC needs to step up with $19.3 million for our grid because we matter. Residents deserve reliable power and water—it’s that simple.

Alright, let’s cut through the noise and get blunt about how the Treasure Island redevelopment, including the 2024 land transfer shenanigans tied to Ordinance 231269 (passed February 16, 2024), stacks up against historical redlining and screws over long-term residents, especially those at Site 12. Right off the bat, the Treasure Island Development Authority (TIDA) is set up—by design—to dodge real grid upgrades, hoarding city funds for its own shiny projects while stiffing the island’s aging infrastructure.

Unlike the rest of San Francisco, where the SFPUC taps into serious cash for fixes—like the $20 million Stern Grove repair after a 2021 flood trashed the place—TIDA’s left to nickel-and-dime its 40-to-50-year-old grid with band-aids. This isn’t some academic fluff—it’s a raw look at how history rhymes and how the system keeps kicking certain people to the curb.

Redlining 2.0: Same Game, New Paint

Historical redlining was straight-up racial and economic segregation, with banks and the feds drawing literal red lines on maps to deny loans. It locked communities out of wealth-building and left them vulnerable to displacement. Fast-forward to Treasure Island 2024: the tools have evolved, but the playbook’s eerily similar.

The redevelopment of this former Navy base, now a shiny prize for San Francisco’s elite, isn’t about uplifting the people who’ve been there—it’s about profit, gentrification, and pushing out those who don’t fit the new glossy vision.

Ordinance 231269, which greenlights TIDA’s takeover of ferry terminals and other fancy improvements, is a brick in the wall of this modern exclusion. The Treasure Island/Yerba Buena Island Development Project, with its 8,000 new housing units and parks, sounds great until you see who it’s for: wealthy newcomers. Meanwhile, the long-term residents—especially the roughly 2,000 folks, many low-income and minority—are getting sidelined.

Site 12 Housing: The Long-Term Residents Left in the Dust

Now, let’s zero in on Site 12—housing for Treasure Island’s long-term residents, some of whom have been there 25 years or more since the Navy days. When you dig into Ordinance 231269 and the broader redevelopment docs, Site 12 barely gets a whisper. The focus is on ferry terminals, open spaces, and shiny new buildings, not on locking in housing for these folks.

Bluntly put: these long-term residents are being erased from the narrative. The city’s dumping millions into ferries and parks while leaving Site 12’s fate dangling—likely to be demolished or "redeveloped" out of existence once the big money rolls in. Historical redlining starved neighborhoods then displaced them for "urban renewal"; here, it’s neglecting existing housing stock, letting it rot, then handing the land to private developers under the guise of "public benefit."

The Bottom Line

Treasure Island’s 2024 land transfer mirrors redlining by prioritizing profit-driven development over the people who’ve held the community together. Site 12’s long-term residents—25 years of roots—aren’t just overlooked; they’re actively excluded from the future being built around them.

Joshua Arce brings attention to the critical issue of power outages on Treasure Island. While his tour covered essential infrastructure-including a detailed look inside a mountain tunnel and an overview of new valve installations-the central focus was on the challenges faced by Treasure Island residents.

Click The Following Link To Watch Video Of Joshua Arce SFPUC CAC: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SiFQ_4m0IE&t=3529s

Click The Following Link To Watch Video At SFPUC Board Commission Meeting: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j09dFzWRQGc

During his visit to the Citizens Advisory Committee of the Public Utilities Commission, Arce engaged in an in-depth conversation with local citizens, discussing the frequent power interruptions affecting the community. His remarks emphasized a strong commitment to resolving these outages, advocating for transparent dialogue and robust solutions to ensure a reliable power supply.

Although he also touched on broader topics such as water policy, conservation efforts related to the Tuolumne River, and salmon habitat restoration, Arce made it clear that addressing the electrical issues on Treasure Island is his top priority. The update concluded with an invitation for public comment, reflecting his dedication to community engagement and support for the local residents.

Joshua Arce, as Vice President of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) and the holder of Seat 2 designated for ratepayer and consumer advocacy, you are in a critical position to tackle the escalating power grid crisis on Treasure Island. With over 500 power outages since 1997—averaging one every two to three weeks—you cannot ignore the severity of this issue.

Your extensive experience in labor relations, workforce development, and community advocacy uniquely equips you to recognize the profound impact these disruptions have on the island’s residents, particularly its low-income and minority communities.

The Crisis at Hand

Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island suffer from power outages at a rate four times higher than PG&E-provided power in San Francisco, with each incident averaging four to five hours. This translates to a staggering 500 outages over 25 years. Census data reveals that 60% of Treasure Island residents are low-income, with 50% living below the poverty line.

Your Role and Responsibility

As Vice President of the SFPUC, you have both the authority and the duty to act. Your Seat 2 role emphasizes protecting ratepayers and consumers. The SFPUC operates the power system for the Treasure Island Development Authority (TIDA), yet the existing grid—serving current residents—languishes while new infrastructure benefits luxury developments. This disparity is unacceptable.

Legal and Moral Imperatives

The resolution cites clear legal grounds for urgent action: City Charter and Administrative Code, Chapter 99 (Public Power), California Constitution and Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection), and Fiduciary Duty.

The Path Forward

1. Emergency Declaration: Advocate for immediate inspections and grid deployment.

2. Inspections by July 2024: Ensure TIDA conducts a comprehensive review per California Public Utilities Commission General Orders.

3. Transparency: Demand TIDA account for the $15 million allocated for grid improvements.

4. Reports and Plans: Oversee the SFPUC’s Failure Mode Analysis Report.

5. Funding and Oversight: Collaborate with the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, and TIDA.

Call to Leadership

Joshua Arce, this is your moment. Use your vote, your voice, and your influence to rally the SFPUC, TIDA, and city leadership. Declare the emergency, fund the fixes, and restore equity to Treasure Island. Your legacy as a champion for ratepayers hinges on this—act with the urgency this crisis demands. The residents of Treasure Island have waited 25 years; they cannot wait another day.

Proposal: SFPUC Board Living and Operating on Treasure Island

SFPUC board should be required to live and operate from Treasure Island—potentially in Building One or another location—until outages fall below three per year. The idea is that by experiencing the outages firsthand (e.g., disrupted utilities, health risks, and daily inconveniences), board members would be more motivated to prioritize and expedite solutions.

Below is a consolidated, anonymized timeline and analysis of the natural gas outage on Treasure Island, sorted from the earliest event to the latest, along with an explanation of its impacts and a discussion of possible legal shortcomings by the responsible agencies.

Timeline of Events

Feb 14, Early AM: A natural gas leak was detected (at a location on Keppler Ct, Unit C) affecting approximately 0–50 housing units. Crews were dispatched to investigate an equipment failure.

Feb 14, 2:13 AM: Crews exited after isolating the leak and shutting off the gas line at several addresses. Restoration status remained uncertain.

Feb 16, 11:29 PM: A new outage began in the northwest part of Treasure Island (near the intersection of 13th Street and Ave. D), impacting 200+ housing units. The gas was shut off due to equipment failure.

Feb 17, 10:09 AM: Crews were en-route to the northwest area; excavation and traffic control efforts started.

Feb 18, 11:14 AM: Gas service was restored in the northwest area—now affecting a total of about 400 units—with a note that a future planned outage would be announced.

An additional update later that day summarized that, over the past four days, approximately 400 units had been affected—leaving about 80% of homes without gas for hot water—and noted that residents had already suffered multiple power outages in recent months.

Impact on Residents

Essential Services Disrupted: Without natural gas, residents were unable to cook, heat their homes, or operate gas water heaters.

Extended Outage Duration: With the outage lasting four days in some areas, many households were forced to endure extended periods without hot water, impacting hygiene and comfort.

Potential Legal and Regulatory Concerns

Under California law, utility providers have a statutory duty to offer safe, reliable, and continuous service. The prolonged disruption in natural gas service may raise concerns under several legal frameworks, including the California Public Utilities Code, California Health and Safety Code, and Implied Warranty of Habitability.

The argument advocates using the $115 million in General Fund Certificates of Participation (COPs) from Files 24-0198 and 24-0202 to fund Treasure Island power grid upgrades.

The proposed ordinance (File 24-0198) and resolution (File 24-0202) amend the Development Agreement and Disposition and Development Agreement (DDA) between the City, Treasure Island Development Authority (TIDA), and Treasure Island Community Development LLC (TICD) to secure $115 million in General Fund Certificates of Participation (COPs) for Stage 2 infrastructure. This funding, intended to advance the Treasure Island/Yerba Buena Development Project, must prioritize power grid upgrades to resolve the persistent outages—over 500 since 1997, averaging 18 annually—disproportionately burdening the 60% low-income residents of Census Tract 6075017902. Here’s why and how this can be achieved:

1. Explicit Scope Includes Utilities

The March 2024 TIDA staff memo confirms the $115 million COPs will fund "utility systems" alongside geotechnical work and streets for Stage 2. Chronic power outages, a documented health and safety crisis, make grid upgrades an urgent utility need. The San Francisco Administrative Code § 99.1 mandates reliable electric service as a public benefit, aligning with the DDA’s community obligations.

2. Existing Residents’ Equity

The Project’s 27.2% affordable housing commitment and 300 acres of public space signal a public benefit focus, yet current residents face a grid unchanged since the Navy’s 1997 exit. The COPs’ purpose—to improve financial feasibility—extends beyond developers to residents enduring a fourfold outage rate compared to PG&E areas. Redirecting a portion of the $115 million to grid stabilization ensures equity, consistent with the Housing Element’s call for infrastructure investment in underserved areas.

3. Legal and Fiscal Flexibility

The Financing Plan’s “Alternate Financing” provision commits the City to fund Stage 2 when CFD and IRFD capacities falter. COPs, issuable in three tranches subject to Board approval, offer flexibility to prioritize grid upgrades in the first $50 million tranche (FY 2024-25). The $550,000 annual CFD/IRFD offset reduces General Fund strain, making this a strategic pivot, not a fiscal overreach.

4. Political Imperative

Mayor Breed’s May 2023 pledge that “safety and well-being” are paramount, coupled with City Charter § 3.100(14) emergency powers, demands action on Treasure Island’s outages. The Board can condition COP approval on a grid-specific deliverable (e.g., new switchgear, per 2020 SFPUC plans), ensuring TIDA fulfills its 1997 Conversion Act duty to all residents.

5. Mitigating Policy Concerns

Critics warn the COPs exhaust City debt capacity through FY 2027-28, but this $245.9 million debt service is a fraction of the $1.6 billion unissued GO bond capacity. Front-loading grid upgrades in the first tranche minimizes long-term fiscal risk, aligns with the Spring 2025 capital plan, and preserves deferred maintenance options elsewhere.

Conclusion

The $115 million COPs are not just developer relief—they’re a lifeline for Treasure Island’s existing residents. The Board must approve Files 24-0198 and 24-0202 with a mandate to allocate funds for grid upgrades, leveraging TIDA’s public-benefit role and the City’s equity commitments. This solves a decades-long problem, proving San Francisco prioritizes its people over profits.

ONGOING RESOLUTION REGARDING EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATIONS, POWER OUTAGES, AND THE CREATION OF AN ENHANCED INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING DISTRICT ON TREASURE ISLAND

President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Approves Emergency Declaration for California: https://gis.fema.gov/maps/dec_4683.pdf

RESOLUTION REGARDING EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATIONS AND POWER OUTAGES ON TREASURE ISLAND: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1BRhn2IQWmIbOrQyHG0za2JZW7LpthTzk/edit?ouid=115732124734693989104&rtpof=true&sd=true&usp=drive_link

The seventh policy priority and strategy for achieving clean and healthy environments in San Francisco is to ensure reliable electricity for all residents. To achieve this, several actions must be taken.

First, there is a need to establish provisions for mandatory electric grid safety plans from TIDA developers and contractors, with community oversight. This is critical to ensuring that any construction work does not compromise the safety of the electric grid.

Secondly, it is important to establish a website that publicly lists all unplanned and planned power outages by neighborhood in San Francisco, going back 25 years and continuing into the foreseeable future. This information can be used by residents and businesses to plan ahead and minimize the impact of power outages.

Thirdly, there is a need to establish a program to study the neighborhoods with the highest amount of outages and give them power and funding to direct all local agencies to upgrade the grid to mitigate outages based on current best practices. By providing power and funding to the affected neighborhoods, they can work collaboratively with local agencies to identify the best ways to upgrade the grid and minimize the number of outages.

By implementing these strategies, San Francisco can achieve reliable electricity for all residents, which is a critical component of a clean and healthy environment.

Priority Policy 3: City provides reliable, affordable, resilient energy service for all of SF.

Strategy 3.0: Increase grid stability to mitigate power outages from all hazard events.

Strategy 3.1: City to conduct a vulnerability and consequences study to ensure reliable and equitable energy service for all residents, especially EJ Communities.

Strategy 3.3: Implement strategies from energy VCA.

Strategy 3.4: Ensure an equitable drawdown of the gas network through robust subsidies and protections for equity communities.

In the City by the Bay, the glaring contrast between aesthetic brilliance and basic utility couldn't be more stark. San Francisco, known for its innovative spirit, is gearing up to light the Bay Bridge with a mesmerizing $11 million display, showcasing 50,000 LEDs—a twinkling tribute to the city's love for high-tech spectacle. (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/02/us/bay-bridge-lights.html)

Meanwhile, just a stone's throw away, Treasure Island is mired in a less glamorous reality, grappling with its 500th power outage since 1997.

Yes, you heard right. While the city dazzles tourists and residents alike with its illuminated marvels, Treasure Island suffers blackout after blackout—an average of one every 2-3 weeks, making its residents experts in navigating their own homes by touch.

The San Francisco Board of Supervisors seemed to take a step in the right direction back in 2017, approving a $1.66 million emergency replace two failing generators on Treasure Island, aimed at bolstering the beleaguered power grid. The resolution, promisingly named R0307-17, hinted at a brighter, more reliable future. But fast forward to the present day, and the island's reality remains dimly lit, both literally and metaphorically.

While $11 million pour into making the Bay Bridge a nighttime enchantment, Treasure Island residents are left wondering why their plight seems less worthy of investment. In a recent escalation, Mayor London N. Breed and other city officials have ramped up their rhetoric against Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) for their role in citywide outages. Yet, it's ironic—or perhaps just plain negligent—that the city itself manages Treasure Island’s grid, which has been a notorious weak link for over a quarter of a century.

The city's sudden urgency addressing a single weekend of PG&E-caused disruptions starkly contrasts with the decades-long saga endured by Treasure Islanders. This selective attention is akin to furiously pointing out a neighbor’s slightly overgrown lawn while your own house is engulfed in flames.

This tale of two utilities lays bare a disheartening disparity. On one hand, PG&E is scrutinized and lambasted for fleeting failures; on the other, the city’s own mismanagement of Treasure Island’s grid—an enduring saga of neglect—is met with what can only be described as a shrug of municipal indifference.

What we witness here is a vivid display of priorities, where a bridge's aesthetic overhaul is deemed more crucial than the basic wellbeing of a community repeatedly left in the dark. It begs the question: What is the real standard of care and commitment by our city leaders? Why does the sparkle of LEDs on a bridge overshadow the necessity of keeping the lights on for its citizens?

In conclusion, while San Francisco’s Bay Bridge prepares to shimmer anew in a grand display of luminous excess, the residents of Treasure Island remain ensnared in a recurring nightmare of darkness. It's high time the city shifts some of its innovative zeal from aesthetic showcases to ensuring that all its communities can enjoy the basic, essential service of reliable power. San Francisco, let’s not just be a beacon of innovation in public spectacles; let’s illuminate our commitment to all residents by keeping their lights on.

Ladies and Gentlemen of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission and the Treasure Island Development Authority,

Let’s not waste time with pleasantries. We are here because of failure—your failure. And it’s high time we call it exactly what it is. Treasure Island is drowning in darkness—figuratively and literally—and you are holding the matches.

Over 18 power outages a year on average. That’s the shameful average this community has endured for decades. Eighteen outages a year—a rate four times worse than the rest of San Francisco itself. Do you understand the weight of that statistic? That is not infrastructure; that is neglect. That is not oversight; that is abandonment. And abandonment is exactly what you’ve done to the people of Treasure Island.

Let me paint the picture for you—because clearly, you haven’t taken the time to see it yourself. A single mom sitting in a pitch-black apartment, praying her child’s insulin doesn’t spoil in the powerless fridge. A family scraping together every penny to survive, only to lose it all when they have to replace spoiled groceries. Elderly residents sitting in cold, dark rooms, their lifelines—medical devices—rendered useless. Children trying to learn in homes without light, without heat. Is that the San Francisco you’re proud of? Is that the progress you stand for?

You’ve promised. Oh, how you’ve promised. Back in 2019, TIDA said an upgrade was coming that would solve it all. “We’d be shocked,” you said, “if there were more than five outages the next year.” Since the upgrade in July 2021, there have been a staggering 63 outages as of 01-09—2025.

This repeated failure highlights the ongoing issues despite promises of improvement. The work, initially scheduled for completion in 2020, faced repeated delays before finally concluding in mid-2021, yet the problems persist:

2021: 20 outages

2023: 19 outages

2024: 23 outages

2025 (so far): 1 outage

The consistent pattern of outages demonstrates how little the upgrade has delivered on its promises.

Let me ask you this: do you ever lie awake at night thinking about the people you’ve failed? Because they lie awake at night—literally—when their homes are plunged into darkness. They can’t ignore it, so why should you? Every flicker, every blackout, every outage is a slap in the face to the residents who trusted you to care, trusted you to do better. You failed them.

You have hidden behind bureaucracy for too long. You’ve deflected, delayed, dodged responsibility. But let me remind you of something: your inaction is not neutral. It is active harm. Every time you failed to fix the grid, every time you delayed critical upgrades, you made a choice. A choice to let people suffer. A choice to let families shiver in the dark. A choice to uphold inequity. And every single one of those choices is on you.

You want the truth? What’s happening on Treasure Island isn’t just an infrastructure problem—it’s a moral failure. A community of 3,000 people has been treated like an afterthought, like collateral damage in your web of incompetence. And for what? Convenience? Complacency? Cost savings? How do you justify that? How do you live with yourselves?

You are the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission. You are the Treasure Island Development Authority. Those names carry responsibility, accountability, and power. But what good is your power if it doesn’t keep the lights on? What good are your titles if you let an entire community rot under your watch?

I demand action, not excuses. Declare a state of emergency for Treasure Island. Bring in experts who will actually fix the system, and appoint people to your boards who will not rest until this community has the reliable power it has been denied for far too long. The time for apologies is over. The time for promises is over. This is your chance to prove you care about more than your titles and your budgets.

Treasure Island deserves better, and you know it. So, no more delays. No more negligence. Fix this, or step aside and let someone with the will and the conscience to do the job take over. Because right now, your legacy is darkness.

And that, my friends, is an unforgivable disgrace.

The Treasure Island Development Authority (TIDA) owns the electric system infrastructure on Treasure and Yerba Buena Islands. The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) operates and maintains the power system for TIDA, and also provides electricity to residents and businesses on both islands.

The U.S. Navy transferred the electric system on Treasure and Yerba Buena Islands to TIDA in 1997. The existing infrastructure is old and has exceeded normal life expectancy. The age of the system and condition of the equipment make the island more vulnerable to power outages.

Power outages arise when something interrupts the distribution of electricity through the system. These "faults" can result from a variety of causes, including fallen tree limbs, birds or other wildlife, and malfunctioning equipment.

Improving System Reliability

Near-term improvements have been completed in the past several months to improve the reliability of the electric system.

New Switchyard and Switchgear: Constructed a new switchyard and installed a new switchgear to isolate certain fault events and prevent an island-wide outage.

New Fault Indicators and Reclosers: Installed numerous fault indicators and reclosers throughout the island, which assist crews in determining the location of a fault and limiting outages to just a portion of the system.

New Overhead Line: Installed and constructed a new overhead line from the switchyard, increasing the reliability of the main line serving both islands.

New Transformers: Replaced five old distribution transformers with new ones equipped with bird guards to prevent avian-related outages. Bird guards will be a standard component on all new transformers.

Bird Guards: Installed bird guards along Avenue I.

Vegetation Management: Removed palm trees to prevent palm fronds from falling on overhead lines.

Residential Reliability: Connected the residential neighborhood to its own circuit to mitigate the impact of faults from other parts of the island.

Relay Settings Updated: Adjusted the relays at the Port of Oakland Substation to allow the circuits and reclosers to better isolate a fault before it results in a system-wide outage.

Above Ground System-Wide Inspection: Completed inspection of the entire distribution system and identified components to be replaced.

More Electric System Improvements Are Needed

Replacement of Damaged Crossarms and Transformers: A contract has been signed with an electrical contractor to replace the damaged crossarms and transformers identified during the system-wide inspection.

Continuous Inspections: Perform continuous inspections to mitigate potential system failures, including regular tree trimming or removal.

Security Fencing: Install security fencing to protect the underground cables from Treasure Island to Yerba Buena Island from vandalism.

Protective Device: Monitor the protective device response and performance to further mitigate system-wide outages.

The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) is the energy provider on Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island. The Treasure Island Development Authority (TIDA) owns the electric infrastructure, which the SFPUC uses to deliver power to residents and businesses on both islands.

Typically, electric infrastructure has a lifespan of 25-30 years. The infrastructure on Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island, which TIDA inherited from the U.S. Navy, ranges from 40-50 years in age. The age of the system and condition of the equipment make the island vulnerable to power outages that a more modern system would not experience or which would be limited to a smaller area.

Power outages on the island arise when something interrupts the distribution of electricity through the system. These “faults” can arise from a variety of causes, including fallen tree limbs, birds or other wildlife, and malfunctioning equipment.

Several improvements have been made in the past 18 months to improve the system reliability and more are scheduled for the year ahead. These near term infrastructure investments will enhance system reliability, decrease the number of blackouts, and reduce the duration and number of customers affected when there is a power outage.

TIDA and the SFPUC have been pursuing four avenues to improve system reliability – preventing faults that could lead to an outage, improving the ability of the system to minimize the impact of a fault, limiting any resulting outages to only a portion of the island rather than the full island, and installing equipment that will help locate where a fault has occurred to speed system restoration.

In 2020 the SFPUC installed fault indicators and reclosers at many locations in the island distribution system. Fault indicators assist crews in determining where in the system a fault has occurred speeding power restoration while reclosers can both help the system to avoid service interruptions following certain minor faults and to limit outages to just a portion of the system when a fault occurs.

Also in 2020, Treasure Island Community Development (TICD), the master developer for Treasure Island, and the SFPUC began constructing a new switchyard and installing new switchgear to serve Treasure Island. This switchgear is scheduled to be energized in the last week of April. The former Navy switchgear is sensitive to system faults and does not effectively separate the existing system into geographically separate circuits. After additional work, the new switchgear will be capable of surviving certain faults that would cause the existing switchgear to fail resulting in an island-wide outage and will support the separation of the island geographically into separate circuits so that outages should be limited to the area served by an individual circuit rather than resulting in island-wide outages.

In addition to the projects initiated in 2020, TIDA and the SFPUC have identified additional priorities for improving system reliability in 2021. TIDA and the SFPUC continue to evaluate additional opportunities for improving the resiliency and reliability of the electrical system on Treasure Island.

Outages in 2021

The work done in 2020 has had some success in limiting the geographic extent of outages. There have been three island-wide outages in 2021 – on April 6th, 11th & 16th – but there have been five other incidents where the extent of the outage was limited to just a portion of the island.

Providing One Portable Back Up Battery(https://power.tenergy.com/tenergy-t320-portable-power-station-300wh-backup-lithium-battery/) to each household would cost in excess of $100,000.

Supplying them only to the Island’s affordable housing residents, would cost in excess of $50,000. No determination has been made yet of how much funding TIDA(https://sftreasureisland.org/contact) may be able to commit to such a program.

TIDA is weighing this potential expense against the cost of planned and proposed investments intended to limit the number and/or extent of outages. For example, TIDA already authorized the SFPUC to order several transformers to replace existing transformers in the residential neighborhood which should be delivered and installed by the end of June, and TIDA is working with the SFPUC and the developer on engineering solutions to further isolate the residential neighborhood from the rest of the island grid. Both of last week’s outages were related to issues south of 9th Street.

TIDA is striving to protect the residential area from system problems that are not directly within the limits of the residential area so that the residents will not lose power in events like those of the 6th and 11th. The second challenge that we are investigating is how logistically any purchase/distribution might be made. There are limitations on TIDA’s (or any public agency’s) ability to spend public funds to directly purchase items and give them away. TIDA is investigating options for how we might execute a program if/when we move forward.

We overall are seeing if partnership with One Treasure Island , TIDA will allow them to fund these back-up batteries for our community, If the government is unable to help then we will work with private partners to raise money donate these directly to households!

At the TIDA Board Meeting on November 18th, 2020, the board discussed and approved a solution to have a mobile trailer with backup batteries to support the community. A video link to the meeting is available at https://youtu.be/WHIaUuiRo40. The non-profit organization Footprint Project was quick to provide the trailer to aid our community. The next steps include working with TIDA to set up a permanent storage location on the island and signing a rental agreement. Additionally, Footprint Project has generously allowed us to use the trailer for free when it is not in use at other communities.

If you are interested in sharing back up batteries right now in collaboration with Crystal Huang People Power Solar Cooperative.

More information here about this solution: https://www.peoplepowersolar.org/ and https://youtu.be/vjehIpaJgcA

Fill out this Google Form: https://www.tinyurl.com/batteryrequestTi

We will have to go through each request and make sure whomever comes through this understands our community agreement.

Join our Slack space! https://join.slack.com/t/communityback-kdw2304/shared_invite/zt-it11j96u-HjQFe8d394NnLiCFrvKU7w Since the 3 batteries are currently with Matt J (2 batteries) and Crystal (1 battery), we should make sure Matt and Crystal are in the #babysitter channel. Anyone who needs battery should ping #babysitters on Slack. This will help us remove a centralized person as a gatekeeper, so we can all self-organize. Anyone who joins our Slack space should be verified people (anyone in this group can invite people, as long as you know them well to protect our community from trolls).

Text BATTERY to the number 510-275-1111 in the flyer shared in the email below.

Background: The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) is the energy provider on Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island. The Treasure Island Development Authority (TIDA) owns the electric infrastructure, which the SFPUC uses to deliver power to residents and businesses on both islands. Typically, electric infrastructure has a lifespan of 25-30 years.

The infrastructure on Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island, which TIDA inherited from the U.S. Navy, ranges from 40-50 years in age. Because the Treasure Island infrastructure is old, diagnostic and repair work takes longer than it would for a typical power outage. Power outages on the island stem from a variety of causes, including fallen tree limbs, birds or other wildlife, and malfunctioning equipment due to the age of the system.

Improving System Reliability and Response

Treasure Island Community Development (TICD) is the master developer for Treasure Island and coordinates with TIDA on its design and construction activities. Together, TICD and the SFPUC have begun making electric system changes on Treasure Island to improve electricity service for all customers. The major improvements include constructing a new switchyard and installing new switchgear.

These near term infrastructure investments will enhance system reliability, decrease the number of blackouts, and reduce the duration and number of customers affected when there is a power outage. TICD will oversee construction of the switchyard, a fenced-off area where the main electrical equipment will be located. Upon completion of the new switchyard, the SFPUC will install new switchgear, which is equipment that helps detect an outage, isolate the affected area, and provide safe and reliable operation of the electric system.

Proactive Steps to Improve Existing System

In addition to new infrastructure, the SFPUC continues to take proactive steps to maintain, operate, and repair the electric system on Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island. These actions will help reduce the number of outages as well as the length of outages:

● Proactively trimming tree branches and other vegetation

● Replacing poles and ordering spare parts in advance

● Conducting regular inspections of the distribution system

● Installing reclosers to improve system resiliency

● Installing fault indicators to speed up repair time

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gPyiar_H1WA - explains re-closer equipment

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2S8gAMUNV_4 - explains fault indicator

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Q-aVBv7PWM - explains substation and how this switch upgrade will also improve the grid.

Electric System Improvements and Timeline

Infrastructure upgrades and equipment replacement are underway, and Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island customers can expect electric system improvements to be completed by January 2021. Please see attached flyer for table with information on forthcoming improvement projects. Residents and businesses can expect minimal disruption during construction. No roads will be blocked or closed during construction.

Since Tuesday, Treasure Island has experienced long periods of power outages due to an equipment failure at the Port of Oakland, where the Island’s power is routed from. All residents and businesses are severely impacted.

Since then, backup generators have been providing power. Last night at midnight, the generators failed and residents have been without power since midnight. City agencies have formed an emergency coordination team to provide interim and long term solutions to this incident.

The following actions are being taken:

1. Emergency Mutual Aid has been requested to state and regional partners to provide replacement parts as soon as possible

2. Emergency backup crews are en route from Modesto to the Port of Oakland to fix the underlying cause

3. PUC is simultaneously attempting to repair the broken generator and awaiting delivery of a backup generator

4. TIDA is setting up community charging stations near residential areas

Treasure and Yerba Buena islands lost power from Davis Substation, a Port of Oakland asset, about 2:30PM yesterday. The islands went on generator power while electricians continue to troubleshoot the needed repairs. The generators run off of diesel fuel. To conserve fuel, generators were shut down last night between 12-5AM. Generators were restarted at 5AM as planned. The Generator at YBI has sufficient fuel; however, the generator at Treasure Island has insufficient fuel for continuous power. TI will experience another outage this morning and power will remain out until refueling is concluded. We are unable to refuel the generators until sometime after 10:30AM. Notifications are going out to keep people informed. Lineworkers are narrowing in on the remaining problem with the electrical grid. We will continue to keep you updated.

SF PUC white paper discussing the concept of photovoltaic systems for energy collection/transmission, as well as battery backup adaptation of PV system, applied at both a grid level and an individual facility level.

What we have learned from this white paper, when applied specifically to the TI/YBI Distribution System, is that a PV/battery system at a grid level would unfortunately not allow for additional reliability or redundancy Island-wide as the causes of unplanned all-Island power outages are on the Distribution System (equipment failures, bird strikes of HV lines, weather damage to HV lines/poles, etc). As these causes are not tied to transmission into the TI/YBI Distribution System, a grid-level PV/battery system intended to provide a backup source of electric transmission into the Distribution System would still be rendered moot on a shorted Distribution System. The Island does have two primary on-Island generators that provide alternate transmission into the Distribution System when there is a transmission-level interruption from the primary transmission source at the Port of Oakland, most recently these generators served that purpose this past August during daylong maintenance work at Port of Oakland. These generators also do not function to provide alternate resiliency to the Island Distribution if the outage cause is on the Distribution System itself. (This above statement should be considered mostly false as this is what just happened on November 5th batteries and solar would stop the following form happening!)

"Treasure and Yerba Buena islands lost power from Davis Substation, a Port of Oakland asset, about 2:30PM yesterday. The islands went on generator power while electricians continue to troubleshoot the needed repairs. The generators run off of diesel fuel. To conserve fuel, generators were shut down last night between 12-5AM. Generators were restarted at 5AM as planned. The Generator at YBI has sufficient fuel; however, the generator at Treasure Island has insufficient fuel for continuous power. TI will experience another outage this morning and power will remain out until refueling is concluded. We are unable to refuel the generators until sometime after 10:30AM. Notifications are going out to keep people informed. Lineworkers are narrowing in on the remaining problem with the electrical grid. We will continue to keep you updated."

The white paper also speaks to building-level applicability of combination PV/battery or standalone battery back-up systems, such as the Tesla “Powerwall”. This is a viable option for individual buildings, and was the general model employed in Puerto Rico to re-energize hospitals and other critical facilities on an emergency basis after Hurricane Maria. In speaking with SFPUC Power, individual installations of Powerwalls or similar products from other manufacturers can happen in a manner that would not cause adverse impacts on the existing Island grid.

If Island residents or households are interested in pursuing installation of Powerwall or similar systems to allow additional resiliency for their residence during Island-wide outages, they may contact their residential property manager to begin the process as a requested Modification to Residential Unit. As with any other proposed Unit Modification, costs would need to be borne by the requesting resident/household and all applicable City project reviews/approvals, including those by Department of Building Inspection related to the building electrical system modifications, must be met, along with any additional requirements or direction issued by the residential property manager.

Please feel free to let us know if there are any questions at this time, particularly on the White Paper contents, as TIDA and PUC are happy to discuss further.

Thank you.

Peter Summerville Treasure Island Development Authority Peter.Summerville@sfgov.org

“in response to the website and inquiry from Barklee, we’ve asked PUC Power to put together a White Paper on the potential applicability of micro-grid technology in supporting the Island during service interruptions. Considering the existing Island distribution system and the number of currently occupied buildings on-Island.

The Puerto Rico model was installation of backup batteries at a series of individual critical facilities. The residents proposal seems to be more of an all-encompassing “master battery power source” to stand the entire Island grid back up during an on-Island unplanned outage.

Will definitely share the PUCs analysis with you once it’s completed, and I imagine we’ll share it with the community and interested residents as well.”